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I. LEGISLATION AND POLICY DEVELOPMENTS 
EU competition policy as the driver of European competitiveness 
European institutions, governments and all stakeholders in the economy have continued to 
work hard on bringing Europe out of the economic crisis. This year we have seen the first 
signs of these common efforts bearing fruit. The Europe 2020 strategy for smart, sustainable 
and inclusive growth provides guidance on the path to follow: building on the EU's key asset, 
the Single Market, we have to reinforce European competitiveness. Competition policy has a 
major and clear role in that process. It protects and strengthens the Single Market, it ensures a 
level playing field for businesses and it supports innovation. As the European Parliament's 
2013 study1 on competition policy has concluded: "Competition plays a crucial role in 
promoting productivity and innovation as drivers of economic growth. This means that 
competition policy, which intensifies competition, will stimulate growth." In that spirit, the 
Commission has continued to consistently enforce all instruments of competition policy and 
to keep the legislative framework for those instruments up to date with the changing 
economic reality. 
State aid 
2013 brought not only the first signs of recovery for the European economy but also results 
for the stabilisation efforts in the banking sector. However, those first positive signs need to 
be underpinned by further measures to ensure sustainability. State aid policy can support 
recovery by ensuring a better and more effective use of scarce public resources. At the same 
time State aid policy maintains undistorted competition in the Single Market, thereby 
contributing to the competitiveness of European companies and EU economy as a whole. 
Crisis related State intervention in support of the financial sector has been essential in saving 
the European banking system from an uncontrolled collapse. State intervention continues to 
be essential in some Member States. The unprecedented amount of public funds spent on 
stabilisation of the financial sector posed a high risk of market distortions. The Commission's 
reformed guidance for aid to the financial sector continues to guarantee compliance with 
competition rules. 
                                                            
1 The Contribution of Competition Policy to Growth and the EU2020 Strategy, IP/A/ECON/ST/2012-25, 
available at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/etudes/join/2013/492479/IPOL-
ECON_ET(2013)492479_EN.pdf  
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The latest figures on the scale of crisis and non-crisis State aid 
 
Between October 2008 and 31 December 2012 Member States provided assistance to the financial sector 
amounting to EUR 591.9 billion (4.6 % of EU 2012 GDP) for capital support (recapitalisation and asset relief 
measures). 
Liquidity support (provided in the form of guarantees and other liquidity measures) reached its peak in 2009 with 
an EU 27 outstanding amount of EUR 906 billion (7.7 % of EU 2012 GDP). . The crisis intensity has gradually 
weakened in many EU countries since then, and the outstanding amount of liquidity support has dropped down 
by more than a half to EUR 534.5 billion (4.14 % of EU 2012 GDP) in 2012. The temporary crisis rules for 
support of the real economy expired in 2011 and the aid granted under those provisions in 2012 amounted only 
to EUR 63 million.  
In 2012, non-crisis State aid increased by roughly EUR 3 billion compared to 2011 and reached EUR 67.2 
billion or 0.52% of EU GDP (an increase by 0.01%). Member States mainly sponsored aid measures for regional 
development, research, environmental protection and providing risk capital to SMEs, all of which contribute to 
the Europe 2020 strategic objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. 
1. State Aid Modernisation: continued reform in support of growth and jobs  
Following the launch of an ambitious State Aid Modernisation programme ("SAM") in May 
20122, the Commission made major progress in translating the main reform principles into 
legislation and guidelines during 2013.  
SAM aims at directing scarce public funds towards growth- and competitiveness-enhancing 
measures and turning State aid policy into a smart and efficient tool to help Member States 
"achieve more with less". The programme has three key objectives, which aim to create a 
State aid control system that supports growth policies, preserves the integrity of the Single 
Market and works together with Member States and European businesses. The SAM 
objectives have also been recognised and supported by the European Parliament in its January 
2013 resolution3. The progress achieved under each objective is outlined in turns below. 
Foster growth in a strengthened, dynamic and competitive internal market 
The Europe 2020 Strategy4 focuses on creating the conditions for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth. One of the key goals of the SAM programme is to support the strategy and 
its flagship initiatives by facilitating well-designed aid targeted at market failures and 
objectives of common European interest ('good aid'). 
The Digital Agenda flagship initiative sets ambitious goals for broadband infrastructure 
development to support growth in Europe. New guidelines aligning the State aid rules on aid 
for broadband with the objectives of the Digital Agenda came into force in January, marking 
the first concrete application of the SAM principles. 
                                                            
2 Communication of 8 May 2012 from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, EU State Aid Modernisation (SAM), 
COM(2012) 209 final 
3 European Parliament resolution of 17 January 2013 on State aid modernisation (2012/2920(RSP)) 
4 COM(2010) 2020 final of 3.3.2010 
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In June, the Commission adopted new regional aid guidelines5 for the period 2014-2020. The 
new guidelines seek to help Europe’s governments spend better, by ensuring that aid goes to 
investments that would not take place without the aid, and that therefore bring real value 
added for regional development.  
Well-targeted aid can also help European competitiveness by stimulating innovation. The 
rules on research, development and innovation (R&D&I) and risk finance aid are particularly 
important in that respect: the Europe 2020 Strategy identifies R&D as a key driver to achieve 
the objectives of smart, sustainable and inclusive growth. The design of EU Financial 
Instruments, such as the Financial Instruments in Horizon 2020 or the Programme for the 
Competitiveness of Enterprises and SMEs (COSME), also needs to be coordinated with State 
aid law.6 The Commission conducted public consultations on new guidelines on R&D&I and 
risk finance aid in the second half of 2013, with a view to their adoption in 2014.7 
Finally, the Europe 2020 Strategy sets headline targets for climate change and energy 
sustainability. In that light, a clear framework is needed for State aid in the field of energy and 
environment. The Commission launched a consultation on guidelines in that field in the 
second half of 2013, following a workshop that took place in April. 
Focusing on cases with the biggest impact on the Single Market  
Simplified and proportionate rules for cases with limited effect on trade also have a role to 
play in helping direct scarce public resources towards 'good aid'. The key tools in that respect 
are the Enabling Regulation and the General Block Exemption Regulation.  
The amended Enabling Regulation8, adopted by the Council in July, is a cornerstone of the 
SAM programme. It makes a proportionate approach possible by adding new categories of aid 
that can be exempted from prior notification to the Commission. At the same time, it ensures 
that the exemption supports the objectives of SAM by covering only measures where 
distortions of competition are limited, the aid is 'good aid' and the Commission has sufficient 
case experience to be able to set appropriate conditions in advance.  
The General Block Exemption Regulation9 (GBER) sets out the detailed terms on which aid 
covered by the Enabling Regulation is exempt from prior notification. The changes to the 
Enabling Regulation make it possible to extend the horizontal and vertical scope of the 
GBER. At the same time, the review of the GBER gives the opportunity to support 
competitiveness by simplifying and clarifying the rules and going further in promoting 'good 
aid' to facilitate growth, while boosting transparency to help ensure that aid remains properly 
targeted even in the absence of notification to the Commission.  
The new GBER will have a significantly extended scope and simplified conditions. 75% of 
today's State aid measures and around 66% of aid amounts would be covered by the new 
GBER. If Member States focus their aid policy on the GBER then some 90% of measures 
                                                            
5 OJ C209, 23.07.2013 
6 In accordance with Article 140. 2. (c) of Regulation (EU, EURATOM) No 966/2012 of 25 October 2012 
7 Risk finance guidelines were adopted on 15 January 2014. See http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-14-
21_en.htm?locale=en.  
8 Council Regulation (EU) No 733/2013 of 22 July 2013 
9 Commission Regulation (EC) No 800/2008 of 6 August 2008 
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could be covered in the future. The Commission proposes to closely work with Member 
States to achieve that goal; inter alia by setting up a dedicated network of State aid country 
desks and preparing new guidelines. They should also help Member States to ensure better 
respect of the GBER conditions when designing their aid measures. To complement that 
significant shift in the exercise of prior controls, the Commission will monitor aid granted 
under the GBER. It will also evaluate the effect of the aid together with Member States.  
Following the amendment of the Enabling Regulation, six new categories of aid previously 
not covered will be included in the GBER: innovation aid to large enterprises, certain aid to 
broadband infrastructures, aid for culture and heritage conservation, including audio-visual 
works, aid for sport and multifunctional recreational infrastructures, aid to make good the 
damage caused by natural disasters and social aid for transport for residents of remote regions. 
In addition, new forms of exempted aid will be introduced for existing categories, such as: a 
wider concept of risk finance aid, investment aid for research infrastructures, a new category 
on start-up aid, new possibilities for energy and environmental aid (e.g. aid for remediation of 
contaminated sites, operating aid for renewables, energy efficiency schemes), enlargement of 
the notion of disadvantaged workers for employment aid to the youngest, and regional aid for 
outermost regions and for urban development schemes.  
Moreover, the revised GBER provides for a significant increase in the notifications thresholds 
in key areas linked to the Europe 2020 agenda, such as R&D&I and risk finance. 
Finally, the proportionate approach is also supported by the de minimis Regulation10 that sets 
out the conditions on which small amounts of State support (up to EUR 200 000) do not 
constitute aid. After a careful review of the available evidence and in view of the support 
fiscal consolidation and the redirection of scarce public funds towards objectives of common 
interest in line with the Europe 2020 agenda, the Commission decided not to change the de 
minimis threshold. However, a number of simplifications and clarifications have been 
introduced in the new Regulation that was adopted on 18 December. Those changes will 
facilitate access to this instrument for all firms when they need it. 
Better targeting and improved ex-post controls 
Enlargement of the GBER should not be confused with softening control. In the present 
economic conditions it is even more important than ever that aid is well-targeted and 
addresses real market failures and cohesion needs. For that reason, aid to large firms in 
assisted regions should be primarily reserved to green-field investments, RDI and energy and 
environmental objectives, if necessary with higher intensities to compensate for regional 
handicap (regional bonuses). Support to ailing firms should only be granted under conditions 
that ensure their ability to come back to viability: the new GBER will consider a single and 
more precise definition of firms in difficulty, based on clearer and simpler criteria established 
in consultation with financial experts and practitioners so as to reflect market practices. 
Such an important enlargement and simplification of the GBER has to be balanced by 
improved ex-post controls. They will be based on greater transparency of aid awards at the 
individual level, more systematic monitoring of compliance with the formal conditions for 
exemption and by introducing ex-post evaluation, notably for the largest schemes in key areas 
relevant for the internal market. Ex-post evaluation will ensure a more solid and effective 
                                                            
10 Commission Regulation (EC) No 1407/2013 of 18 December 2013 on the application of Articles 107 and 108 
of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union to de minimis aid, OJ L 352, 24.12.2013. p. 1 
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method to ensure good aid with incentive effect, and it will help designing better schemes 
with more limited impact on competition and trade. Predefined thresholds will provide 
predictability and legal certainty as to the schemes to be evaluated. In order to ensure a 
common guidance and the same treatment to all, the Commission launched a public 
consultation on a common methodology for ex post evaluation in the summer of 2013. It aims 
to adopt the revised regulation in the first half of 2014. 
Streamlined and clearer rules and faster decisions increase the efficiency of aid distribution 
The SAM programme also involves streamlining the rules, to allow the Commission to adopt 
faster and better decisions and concentrate its resources on the most important cases.  
To that end, the Council adopted the new Procedural Regulation11 in July. The regulation 
allows the Commission to improve the handling of complaints. In particular, it introduces new 
requirements designed to improve the quality of information received from complainants and 
clarifies the requirements to lodge them. For example, a mandatory complaints form is 
introduced and the complainant must show the existence of an interest to act, in order to be 
able to file a formal complaint. Moreover, a complaint will be considered withdrawn in case 
the complainant does not provide meaningful information or fails to cooperate. 
The amended Procedural Regulation also gives the Commission the power to collect the 
appropriate information on a case within business-relevant deadlines. In particular, the 
Commission can obtain information directly from market participants and conduct sector 
inquiries.  
Lastly, the regulation will facilitate coherent application of State aid rules across Member 
States through its provisions on cooperation with national courts. The role of the national 
courts has been reinforced. On the one hand, national courts can now obtain information from 
the Commission for the purpose of applying Article 107(1) and 108 of the Treaty on the 
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Courts can also ask the Commission for an 
opinion on a concrete case. On the other hand, the Commission can make oral or written 
submissions to national courts in the EU public interest (amicus curiae). 
2. Monitoring, recovery and cooperation with national courts 
Increased monitoring of existing State aid to ensure a level playing field 
Over the years, the architecture of State aid control has evolved significantly. Today, roughly 
85% of aid granted to industry and services is not individually examined by the Commission, 
but is granted on the basis of previously approved aid schemes or under block exemption 
regulations12. DG Competition monitors the way in which Member States apply existing aid 
schemes by doing regular, sample based, ex-post checks.  
To further improve the effectiveness of that control which is relevant to the proper 
functioning of the Single Market, DG Competition decided in 2011 to significantly enlarge 
                                                            
11 Council Regulation (EU) No 734/2013 of 22 July 2013, OJ L 204 31 July 2013, p.15, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:204:SOM:EN:HTML 
12 See the State Aid scoreboard, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/scoreboard/index_en.html  
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the scope of those sample checks (from 20 to 30 cases reviewed per "monitoring exercise", to 
more than 50). In the context of the 2012/2013 monitoring exercise DG Competition 
examined a sample of 63 existing aid schemes involving all Member States, all main types of 
aid and covering 33% of Member States expenditure under existing schemes. The 
investigation of a number of cases is still on-going, but it can already be noted that issues or at 
least questions are raised in several cases. These issues are of varying types and gravity e.g. 
non-notified modification of schemes, individual aids exceeding the maximum thresholds, 
compatibility conditions not properly reflected in the national legal basis etc.  
The fact that irregularities are detected in a number of cases is obviously a source of concern. 
However, it must be noted that the detection of an irregularity does not necessarily mean that 
incompatible aid was granted and that competition was distorted. For example an individual 
aid that did not meet the conditions of the scheme under which it was granted, although in 
principle problematic, could be found compatible on another basis (e.g. as de minimis). 
Therefore, while monitoring shows that Member States are not always abiding by the rules 
and there is scope for improvement in terms of compliance, at the same time the actual impact 
of the detected irregularities on the market should not be overestimated.  
The Commission follows-up systematically all irregularities and uses the means at its 
disposal, as appropriate, to address the competition distortions that these may have induced. 
In some cases, Member States offer to voluntarily redress the problems detected (amend 
national legislation, recover the excess aid granted etc.). In other cases, formal action may be 
necessary to tackle the detected irregularities. In 2013, the Commission opened the formal 
investigation procedure in 2 cases where, in the context of the monitoring, doubts were raised 
on the correct implementation of the examined schemes. The formal investigation procedure 
is on-going. 
Restoring competition through recovery of State aid granted in contravention of the rules 
To ensure the integrity of the Single Market, the Commission has the power and the duty to 
request Member States to recover unlawful and incompatible aid which has unduly distorted 
competition and trade between Member States. In 2013, further progress was made to ensure 
that recovery decisions are enforced effectively and immediately.  
Continued efforts to recover illegal aid  
The most recent figures13 show that Member States recover illegal aid much faster in recent years. 69% of 
incompatible aid has been recovered (around EUR 13.5 billion since January 2004) thanks to the Commission's 
action, probably facilitated by the pressure to consolidate public finances. The percentage of illegal and 
incompatible aid still to be recovered has therefore fallen from 75% at the end of 2004 to around 21% on 31 
December 2013.   
In 2013, the Commission adopted nine decisions ordering recovery of incompatible aid, 
ensuring the recovery of over EUR 726 million by the Member States. As of the end of 
December 2013, the Commission had 52 pending active recovery cases (compared to 94 cases 
at the end of 2004). 
 
                                                            
13 More details on recovery data, is available at the dedicated section of the State aid Scoreboard, 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/studies_reports/recovery.html  
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Recovery decisions adopted in 2013 9
Amount recovered in 2013 (in EUR 
million) 726
Pending active recovery cases on 31 
December 2013 52
As a guardian of the Treaty, the Commission may use all legal means at its disposal to ensure 
that Member States implement their recovery obligations, including launching infringement 
procedures. In 2013, the Court of Justice condemned three Member States pursuant to Article 
108(2) TFEU (Italy four times, Spain and Greece).  
Moreover, in 2013, the Commission adopted for the first time a decision fixing an amount to 
be paid by a Member State in implementation of a Court ruling requiring that Member State 
to make penalty payments, following its failure to implement recovery.  
The case in relation to which that decision was adopted concerns an employment aid scheme 
which was introduced by Italy in 1984 and involved employers' exemption from social 
security contributions for certain types of contracts. In its decision adopted on 11 May 1999, 
the Commission found that part of the aid was incompatible with the internal market and 
ordered its recovery. On 1 April 2004, the Court of Justice found that Italy had failed to 
comply with the Commission's decision ordering the recovery14. Despite the Court's 
judgement, little progress was made; therefore the Commission referred Italy to the Court for 
the second time under Article 260 TFEU15. By judgment of 17 November 2011, the Court of 
Justice found that Italy had failed to implement both the Commission's decision and the 
Court's 2004 judgment. The Court therefore ordered Italy to pay a lump sum (EUR 30 
million) and periodic penalty payments, depending on the recovery progress achieved every 6 
months by reference to the outstanding aid on the date of the judgement. The Commission 
will continue to enforce the Court's ruling as regards the penalty payments, until Italy fully 
implements recovery of the illegal and incompatible aid. 
Cooperation with national courts to ensure the effectiveness of State aid rules on the ground 
The Commission continued its cooperation with national courts under the Notice on the 
Enforcement of State Aid Law by National Courts of 2009 (the 'Enforcement Notice'). While 
(so far) no requests for information were received, the Commission received one request for 
an opinion from the Oberverwaltungsgericht Berlin-Brandenburg. The request concerned the 
calculation of the net grant equivalent of an approved grant (regional aid) and was treated 
during 2013. Furthermore, as a follow-up to the Enforcement Notice, the Commission's 
advocacy efforts continued. In 2013, the Commission was actively involved in financing 
training programmes for national judges following an annual call for projects, and also sent 
trainers to teach at such workshops and conferences (see also section 6 of the Antitrust & 
cartels title, on the Cooperation with National Courts).  
                                                            
14 Case C-99/02 Italy v Commission, judgment of 1 April 2004 
15 Case C-469/09 Italy v Commission, judgment of 17 November 2011 
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3. Significant judgments by EU Courts in the State aid area 
The EU courts clarified certain aspects of key State aid concepts in a number of significant 
judgments in 2013.  
In the so-called France Télécom judgment16 the Court of Justice clarified in an appeal the link 
between the conditions of State resources and advantage needed for State aid to be present. 
The Court overruled the General Court's judgment and confirmed that the Commission was 
correct in finding that the announcement of State support on 4 December 2002 and a 
shareholder loan offer, taken together, constituted State aid in favour of France Télécom 
("FT"). The Court of Justice clarified that for establishing the existence of State aid, several 
State interventions might, depending on their links with one another and their effects, be 
regarded as a single intervention. The Court noted that it was clear in that case that the 
announcement was inseparable from the shareholder loan offered.  
The General Court, in its judgment on nature conservation areas17, upheld the Commission's 
decision stating that aid was involved in German measures to support large-scale nature 
conservation projects and the transfer of natural heritage sites to environmental protection 
organisations free of charge. The Court clarified that although the environmental protection 
tasks entrusted to the organisations did not constitute an economic activity, the environmental 
protection organisations had to be considered as undertakings to the extent that they offered 
goods and services in competitive markets, namely sales of wood, granting of hunting and 
fishing leases and touristic services. As those activities could be dissociated from their non-
economic activities, the organisations qualified as undertakings when carrying out those 
economic activities.  
Regarding the market economy creditor test, the General Court confirmed18 the Commission's 
decision concerning Rousse Industry, a Bulgarian entrerprise. The Commission refused the 
authorisation of an agreement on rescheduling a debt in favour of Rousse Industry pre-dating 
Bulgaria's accession and ordered recovery of illegal aid. The judgment clarified the 
application of the market economy creditor test in cases of default on debt rescheduling 
agreements by a debtor in difficulty without clear prospects of return to viability. In such 
situations, a private creditor would not limit itself to 'soft' recovery actions, but would rather 
take decisive action, i.e. proceed at least to the forced execution of the pending debt. It also 
established that lack of recovery action following a failure to comply with a debt-rescheduling 
agreement constitutes a substantial modification of the initial debt rescheduling agreement. 
The judgment recalled the distinction between the general concept of existing aid in the 
Procedural Regulation and the specific application of the concept of 'existing' aid for the new 
member States. For the new Member States, the Accession Treaties define a more restrictive 
concept of 'existing aid', which covers only: a) aid put into effect before a specified cut-off 
date (in the case of Bulgaria, 10 December 1994); b) aid specifically listed in the annex to the 
Accession Treaty as 'existing aid', and c) aid that was approved by the national State aid 
authority prior to accession and in respect to which the Commission had not raised objections. 
                                                            
16 Joined Cases C-399/10P and C-401/10P Bouygues SA, Bouygues Télécom SA v Commission, judgment of 19 
March 2013 
17 Case T-347/09 Germany v Commission, judgment of 12 October 2013 
18 Case T-489/11 Rousse Industry AD v Commission, judgment of 20 March 2013  
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The Court of Justice confirmed19 the negative decision with recovery adopted by the 
Commission as regards the incompatible aid granted to the Greek shipyard Ellinika Nafpigeia 
throughout the period 1985-2005 in the context of its liquidation and successive privatisation. 
The judgment is important for underlining, once again, that the scope of the exemption from 
the EU State aid discipline foreseen by Article 346(1)(b) TFEU for military/defence measures 
must be strictly interpreted. In particular, a clear distinction must be made between the 
production and commercialisation of military material, on the one hand, and any other 
economic activity on the other hand, especially in cases where the beneficiary undertaking is 
engaged in both types of activities. Undertakings which engage in both types of activities 
cannot invoke the military defence exemption for the whole of their production/activities, i.e. 
including the civil part, by arguing that the civil production is necessary for the viability of the 
military/defence activity and indissolubly linked to it. 
The General Court handed down two judgments that address the question of the application in 
time of State aid rules. In Case T-92-11 – Andersen v Commission, judgment of 20 March 
("Danske Statsbaner"), the General Court partially annulled a Commission decision declaring 
the State aid contained in the public service transport contract between the Danish Ministry of 
Transport and Danske Statsbaner (the incumbent Danish railway company) compatible with 
the internal market. It ruled that the Commission had erred in law in applying Regulation no 
1370/2007 instead of Regulation No 1191/69, the latter being the substantive rule at the time 
when the aid had been paid. It considered that as a general principle, aid notified but not paid 
out should be assessed under the substantive rules in force at the date on which the 
Commission takes its decision. Aid which has been paid out without notification has in 
principle to be assessed under the substantive rules in force at the time the aid was paid out, 
unless exceptional conditions for retroactive application of the new legal basis are fulfilled. 
In Case T-570/08 RENV - Deutsche Post v Commission, judgment of 12 November, the 
General Court found, however,  that aid which has been paid out without prior notification 
constitutes an on-going situation, and not a definitive situation, and that for that reason, new 
rules of compatibility apply with immediate effect to the assessment of aid paid out without 
prior notification. Such aid therefore has to be assessed on the basis of the rules in force at the 
time the Commission adopts its decision. 
The Commission has lodged an appeal against the ruling of the General Court in Danske 
Statsbaner, inviting the Court of Justice to review the findings of the General Court with 
respect to the application in time of substantive State aid rules. This will be an opportunity to 
clarify this important question on which the case law has so far taken different positions, and 
provide legal certainty. 
In its judgment of 24 October in Joined Cases C214/12 P, C215/12 P and C223/12 P – Land 
Burgenland v Commission, the Court of Justice dismissed the appeals against a ruling of the 
General Court which had confirmed the Commission's decision on the privatisation of Bank 
Burgenland by the Province of Burgenland through a tender procedure. In the final phase of 
the tender two bids were made, one by the Austrian company GRAWE (EUR 100.3 million), 
and a much higher one by a Ukrainian Consortium (EUR 155 million). The tender was 
awarded to GRAWE. The Commission found that the sale constituted State aid for GRAWE 
                                                            
19 Case C-246/2012 P Ellinika Nafpigeia AE v. Commission, judgment of 28 February 2013 
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because, by not taking the highest bid, the Province of Burgenland did not behave like a 
private seller operating in a market economy. The Court of Justice confirmed that existing 
public guarantees should not be taken into account in the evaluation of the bids because the 
guarantees concerned constituted State aid (i.e. by definition granted by the State exercising 
its prerogatives as a public authority), and a private investor would not grant aid. When there 
is an open, transparent and unconditional tender procedure, it can be presumed that the 
highest bid corresponds to the market price if the bid is binding and credible and the 
consideration of economic factors other than the price is not justified. In such a case the 
Commission is not obliged to look at other methods, such as independent studies, to establish 
the market price. In addition, the reasons of a potential buyer for submitting a bid are not 
relevant from the perspective of a private vendor.  
Finally, the Court of Justice held in Case C284/12 – Lufthansa v Flughafen Frankfurt Hahn20 
that when the Commission has opened a formal investigation procedure, the national courts 
are required to enforce the obligation to suspend the implementation of the relevant aid 
measure. If the national court has doubts about whether the measures constitute State aid, it 
may seek clarification from the Commission and, in accordance with the second and third 
paragraphs of Article 267 TFEU, it may or must refer a question to the General Court for a 
preliminary ruling. 
The Court acknowledges that the assessment in the opening decision is preliminary in nature, 
but considers that the effectiveness of the stand-still obligation in Article 108(3) TFEU and 
the preventive character of State aid control require the national courts to take measures to 
suspend the implementation of the measure even if the Commission's final decision were later 
on to conclude that there were no aid elements. In addition, the Court refers to the principle of 
sincere cooperation (Article 4(3) TEU), from which it derives that national courts must refrain 
from taking decisions which conflict even with a provisional Commission decision. 
 
Antitrust & Cartels 
1. Technology Transfer Agreements – on-going review  
The EU aims to achieve a more competitive, connected, greener, knowledge-based and 
inclusive society. In particular, innovation and competitiveness are fundamental to the 
Commission's Europe 2020 Strategy.21 Innovation often results in greater prosperity and a 
more efficient use of scarce resources, with knowledge as the key input.  
Efficiency enhancing technology transfer agreements between competitors or non-competitors 
promote innovation and competitiveness in Europe by ensuring that technologies are 
disseminated to also other companies than the original inventor. Dissemination of technology 
enables more competition and can also increase follow-on innovation.  
                                                            
20 Case C284/12 – Lufthansa v Flughafen Frankfurt Hahn20,  judgment of 21 November 2013. 
21 Communication from the Commission, Europe 2020, A strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive growth, 
3.3.2010, (COM) 2010 2020 , available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/eu2020/pdf/COMPLET%20EN%20BARROSO%20%20%20007%20-
%20Europe%202020%20-%20EN%20version.pdf  
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The review of the existing guidelines and the block exemption regulation for technology 
transfer (TTBER) continued in 2013. The goal of that revision is to strengthen incentives for 
research and innovation, facilitate the diffusion of intellectual property and stimulate 
competition. 
A draft TTBER and draft Guidelines were published for public consultation on 20 February. 
The public consultation ran until 17 May. The Commission received 58 replies from 
stakeholders22.   
Stakeholders seem, in general, to be more comfortable in self-assessing the compliance of 
their technology transfer agreements with Article 101 TFEU. They support the current effects-
based approach to enforcement that the Commission has been promoting since modernisation 
of EU competition law in 2004. The overall majority of stakeholders indicate that the current 
system has given them flexibility to organise their cooperation, notably through the so called 
"safe harbours" provided for in the TTBER and the Guidelines. Therefore, companies 
welcome that the Commission is keeping the overall structure of the regime. As regards 
specific proposed changes in the draft TTBER and Guidelines, most of the submissions 
focused on proposed changes as regards market share thresholds, termination clauses, 
exclusive grant-back clauses and patent pools. 
The Commission is now in the process of reviewing the draft TTBER and Guidelines in light 
of the input received in the public consultation and aims at adopting final texts in spring 2014.  
2. Notice on Agreements of Minor Importance – on-going review 
Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) prohibits 
agreements that aim at, or result in, appreciable restrictions of competition. The current Notice 
on Agreements of Minor Importance (De Minimis Notice)23, adopted in 2001, creates a market-
share based safe harbour for agreements that the Commission considers as having a non-
appreciable effect on competition. Agreements between competitors are deemed not to have an 
appreciable effect on competition if the aggregate market share of the companies involved does 
not exceed 10%. For agreements between non-competitors the relevant market share is 15%. 
However, if an agreement, be it between competitors or non-competitors, contains a particularly 
serious restriction of competition, known as hardcore restriction, it will not be able to benefit 
from the safe harbour. 
In July, following a consultation of the Member States, the Commission launched a public 
consultation on a revised draft of the De Minimis Notice. The proposed revision of the Notice 
seeks to reflect the ruling of the European Court of Justice in the Expedia case24, which clarified 
that an agreement that has an anti-competitive object constitutes, by its nature and 
independently of any concrete effect that it may have, an appreciable restriction on 
competition. Accordingly, the revised draft Notice provides that agreements containing a 
restriction by object will always constitute an appreciable restriction of competition if they 
                                                            
22 The replies are available on the Commission's website at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_technology_transfer/index_en.html   
23 Commission Notice on agreements of minor importance which do not appreciably restrict competition under 
Article 81(1) of the Treaty establishing the European Community (de minimis), Official Journal C 368, 
22.12.2001, p.13-15 
24 Case C-226/11 Expedia v Autorité nationale de la concurrence, Judgement of 13 December 2012 
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affect trade between Member States. Secondly, the revised draft proposes technical changes to 
ensure that the De Minimis Notice is consistent with other recently amended competition rules, 
in particular the 2010 Vertical and Horizontal Block Exemption Regulations. 
The public consultation on the revised draft Notice was closed in October. The Commission is 
currently reflecting on the implications of the responses received and is working towards 
adopting a revised Notice in 2014.  
3. Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions adopted 
On 11 June, the Commission adopted a Proposal for a Directive on antitrust damages actions25, 
an initiative which has long been awaited by stakeholders and which is a policy priority for the 
current Commission. Under EU law, any person or company who suffered harm because of an 
infringement of EU competition law has a right to full compensation. The proposal has two 
complementary goals. First, the proposal aims at optimising the interplay of private damages 
claims with the public enforcement by the Commission and national competition authorities, to 
safeguard strong public enforcement and to achieve a more effective enforcement overall.  
Second, to make the EU right to compensation a reality in all Member States, by removing key 
practical difficulties which consumers and companies frequently face when they seek redress. 
To achieve these goals, the proposal includes substantive and procedural rules on crucial aspects 
of antitrust damages actions, such as access to evidence, limitation periods for bringing an 
action, standing and the burden of proof with regard to compensation for overcharges passed on 
along the distribution chain. The proposal seeks to create legal certainty as to the accessibility of 
evidence produced for the purposes of public enforcement. For instance, in order to safeguard 
the attractiveness of leniency programmes, it provides that leniency corporate statements should 
never be disclosed in private damages litigation. The proposal facilitates follow-on damages 
claims by stipulating that final infringement decisions by national competition authorities have 
probative effect. 
The legislative proposal has been submitted to the European Parliament and the Council under 
the ordinary legislative procedure. On 2 December, the Competitiveness Council adopted a 
General Approach on that initiative.26 In the European Parliament, the file is shared between 
three Committees: Economic and Monetary Affairs (ECON), Legal Affairs (JURI) and 
Internal Market and Consumer Protection (IMCO). The latter adopted an opinion on the 
proposal on 17 December. 
In parallel to the proposal, the Commission adopted a Communication on quantifying antitrust 
harm in actions for damages based on breaches of Article 101 or 102 TFEU, to provide 
guidance to courts and to the parties in such actions.27 This is accompanied by a more 
                                                            
25 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, COM(2013) 404 final, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0404:FIN:EN:PDF 
26 The General Approach is available at 
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/doc/srv?l=EN&t=PDF&gc=true&sc=false&f=ST%2017317%202013%20INI
T&r=http%3A%2F%2Fregister.consilium.europa.eu%2Fpd%2Fen%2F13%2Fst17%2Fst17317.en13.pdf  
27 Communication from the Commission on quantifying harm in actions for damages based on breaches of 
Article 101 or 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, OJ 2013/C 167/07, 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:167:0019:0021:EN:PDF 
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comprehensive Practical Guide drawn up by the Commission's services28 and available in all 
official EU languages. Finally, the proposal is complemented by the Commission 
Recommendation on collective redress29, which recommends that all Member States introduce 
collective redress mechanisms to facilitate the enforcement of the rights that all Union citizens 
have under Union law, including the right to compensation for antitrust harm.  
4. Significant judgments by EU Courts in antitrust and cartels 
Deutsche Bahn  
In Deutsche Bahn30, the General Court confirmed the legality of the Commission's 
unannounced inspections at the premises of the German railway incumbent Deutsche Bahn in 
2011. The Court ruled that inspections may be carried out based solely on a Commission 
decision and do not require prior authorisation by a judge. The Court also confirmed that the 
rules on inspections set out in Regulation no. 1/2003 do not violate fundamental rights, as 
protected by the European Charter of Fundamental Rights, as the Regulation and the system of 
remedies in the Treaty provide for sufficient safeguards to protect the company's rights of 
defence and right to effective judicial protection. The Court further confirmed that inspectors 
cannot be expected to be able to immediately assess whether certain documents are within the 
scope of the inspection decision, but they must be able to read the documents to make that 
assessment. The applicants have appealed the judgment before the Court of Justice. 
Schindler  
In Schindler31, the Court of Justice dismissed an appeal against a 2011 judgment of the General 
Court upholding the Commission decision32 from 2007 fining Schindler and various 
subsidiaries for their participation in the "Elevators and escalators" cartel. With reference to the 
2011 Menarini judgment of the European Court of Human Rights33, the Court confirmed that 
the current EU antitrust enforcement system – in which the Commission as administrative 
agency imposes fines subject to judicial review – does not violate fundamental rights and in 
particular the principle of effective judicial protection established by Article 6 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. It stated that in view of Menarini, the review court must have 
"the power to quash [the decision] in all respects, on questions of fact and law"34. In particular, 
the Court of Justice held that the notion of full jurisdiction requires an examination of "all 
                                                            
28 Practical Guide: Quantifying harm in actions for damages, Commission Staff Working Document, C(2013) 
3440, http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/actionsdamages/quantification_guide_en.pdf 
29 Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and compensatory 
collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of rights granted under Union Law, 
OJ 2013 L 201/60, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:201:0060:0065:EN:PDF 
30 Joined cases T-289/11, T-290/11 and T-521/11, Deutsche Bahn AG and Others v European Commission, 
judgment of the General Court of 6 September 2013 
 
31  Case C-501/11 P Schindler Holding and Others v Commission, judgement of Court of Justice of 18 July 2013. 
32 Case COMP/E1/38.823 PO/Elevators and Escalators, Commission Decision of 21 February 2007, C (2007) 512 
final 
33  Case 43509/08 A. Menarini Diagnostics S.R.L v Italy, judgment of the European Court of Human Rights of 27 
September 2011 
34 Case C-501/11 P Schindler Holding and Others v Commission, judgement of Court of Justice of 18 July 2013, 
paragraph 35. 
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questions of fact and law relevant to the dispute". The Court of Justice went on to hold that the 
judicial review exercised by the EU courts in competition cases meets that standard because: (a) 
within the sphere of "review of legality", the EU courts carry out a "full and unrestricted 
review"; and (b) within the sphere of "unlimited jurisdiction", the EU courts can substitute their 
own appraisal for the Commission’s and consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the fine. 
CISAC 
In a series of 22 judgments the General Court ruled35 on the appeals brought by 21 collecting 
societies and the International Confederation of Societies of Authors and Composers 
(“CISAC”) against the Commission Decision of 16 July 200836.   
The Commission found in the CISAC decision that Art. 101 TFEU prohibits certain provisions 
in reciprocal representation agreements among collecting societies in the EEA, which have the 
effect of restricting competition among them by limiting their ability to offer their services to 
authors and commercial users (such as RTL or Apple) outside their domestic territory. In the 
case at hand, authors were forced by virtue of membership clauses to enrol with the society of 
their own State, while collecting societies could not provide their services outside their own 
allocated territory due to exclusivity restrictions. The Decision also found that the collecting 
societies coordinated their bilateral arrangements to ensure that commercial users only obtained 
licenses limited to the domestic territory of each collecting society.  
The Court gave guidance with regard to the required standard to prove concerted practices and 
with respect to the concepts used to establish the existence of concertation and those used to 
establish the existence of a restriction of competition. It endorsed the findings of the 
Commission in relation to the "membership clauses" and has also upheld the principle that 
collecting societies must be able to provide services outside their territory. In the judgment on 
the appeal by the Swedish collecting society (STIM) the Court addressed the issue of the 
relationship between Article 101 and Article 167 TFEU (on cultural aspects), as well as the 
treatment of cultural claims under Article 101 TFEU. However, the General Court found that 
the Commission had failed to adduce sufficient evidence of a concerted practice whereby each 
collecting society was alleged to have limited, in its reciprocal representation agreements, the 
right to grant licences relating to its repertoire in the territory of another collecting society party 
to the agreement. 
Cartel judgments: the Courts confirm the Commission´s approach to parental liability 
The Courts have continued to clarify and confirm the Commission's practice on parental liability. In Portielje37 the 
Court of Justice sided with the Commission and reversed the finding of the General Court, which had concluded 
that the presumption had been successfully rebutted. The Court of Justice clarified that parental liability has to be 
assessed on the basis of all relevant factors relating to the economic, organisational and legal links and not only 
those related to company law. In the same judgment, the Court of Justice also clarified that the fact that the parent 
company itself does not have any economic activity is irrelevant, as long as it constitutes a single undertaking with 
the entity that directly participated in the infringement.  
                                                            
35 Cases T-392/08, T-398/08, T-401/08, T-410/08, T-411/08, T-413/08 to T-422/08, T-425/08, T-428/08, T-
432/08, T-433/08, T-434/08, T-442/08, T-451/08, judgments of the General Court of 12 April 2013. 
36 Case COMP/C2/38.698 CISAC, Commission Decision of 16 July 2008, C(2008) 3435 final 
37 Case C-440/11 P Commission v Stichting Administratiekantoor Portielje and Gosselin Group NV, judgment of 
the Court of Justice of 11 July 2013 
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In two judgments relating to the Chloroprene Rubber cartel, the Court of Justice confirmed the Commission's 
findings on the imputation of parental liability in a joint venture constellation for a 50/50 joint venture between 
Dow and DuPont38.  
The General Court also further clarified the application of parental liability by confirming in the Bananas cases that 
Del Monte was liable as a parent company for a limited partnership under German law (Kommanditgesellschaft), 
although Del Monte was only the limited partner in that relationship (case T-587/08, Del Monte). 
Del Monte and Dole  
In Del Monte39 and Dole40 the Court also confirmed the Commission's finding that the bilateral 
exchange of not publicly available "pre-pricing" information, relating to the fixing of quotation 
prices, constituted a concerted practice that had the object to restrict competition.  
Marine hoses 
In the Marine Hoses cartel case, the General Court delivered three judgments41 in which it 
upheld for the most part the Commission's 2009 decision42 that a number of companies active in 
the business of marine hoses (used to transport crude oil to and from ships) participated in a 
world-wide cartel. The General Court endorsed point 18 of the 2006 Fines Guidelines and the 
method used to calculate the fines in situations where the EEA sales would not be representative 
for example because of the existence of a 'home market' protection rule.  
The General Court partly annulled the Commission's decision in the Parker case.43 The General 
Court found that the Commission has wrongly interpreted the concept of economic continuity to 
the infringing undertakings. The Commission has appealed the judgment at the Court of Justice. 
The General Court also provided guidance on the notion of repeated infringement in the MRI 
case44. The Court found in particular that if an undertaking’s participation in the infringement 
was interrupted and that the infringement committed by the undertaking before and after that 
period has the same features, the infringement in question must be characterised as a single 
infringement and as a repeated infringement. In that case, the Commission cannot impose a fine 
in respect of the period during which the infringement was interrupted.45 
Bathroom fittings 
In the Bathroom fittings cartel case, the General Court confirmed46 the Commission's finding of 
a single overarching cartel, which affected six Member States, lasted from 1992 to 2004, and 
                                                            
38 Case C-172/12 P EI du Pont de Nemours and Case C-179/12 P Dow Chemical Company v Commission, 
judgment of the Court of Justice of 26 September 2013 
39 Case T-587/08 Fresh Del Monte Produce v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 14 March 2013 
40 Case T-588/08 Dole Food and Dole Germany v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 14 March 2013 
41 Case T-146/09 Parker v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 17 May 2013; Joined Cases T-147/09 
and T-148/09 Trelleborg v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 17 May 2013; and Case T-154/09 MRI v 
Commission, judgment of the General Court of 17 May 2013 
42 Case COMP/39406 - Marine Hoses, Commission Decision of 28 January 2009 
43 Case T-146/09 Parker v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 17 May 2013 
44 Case T-154/09 MRI v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 17 May 2013 
45 Case T-154/09 MRI v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 17 May 2013, paragraphs 199, 200. 
46 Case T-411/10 Laufen Austria v Commission, judgment of the General Court of 16 September 2013 
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covered three product groups (ceramics, taps and fittings, shower enclosures). The coordination 
took place during meetings of national trade associations and in bilateral contacts and it 
consisted of fixing price increases, minimum prices, rebates, and exchanging sensitive business 
information.  
5. A top priority in the fight against cartels – making use of leniency and settlement 
DG Competition’s strong enforcement record against hard core cartels continued in 2013. The 
Commission continued to receive a constant flow of immunity and leniency applications, 
close to the long term trend of around two applications per month. Although the total number 
is lower than for 2011 and 2012, those years were exceptional, given the large number of 
applications in the car parts sector, where one application and investigation quickly spurred 
additional immunity applications. 
The wire harnesses decision47 is the first decision in the car parts sector; more are likely to 
follow. It is the seventh cartel settlement decision adopted by the Commission demonstrating 
the increasing success of the settlement system which gives companies a 10% reduction in the 
fine if they accept liability for the infringement and do not contest the Commission’s findings. 
Settlement is used if the Commission considers after screening that a case is suitable for 
settlement and the parties are willing to cooperate in the procedure. It is an effective 
resolution tool of cartel proceedings since it allows freeing up resources more quickly to fight 
other cartels and therefore contributes to further deterrence in that respect. 
Although settlements can lead to quicker decisions, the Commission will not pursue 
settlements at any cost. It has a responsibility as a public enforcer to take decisions in the 
public interest; if companies and the Commission cannot reach a common understanding on 
the existence and the characteristics of a cartel, then settlements will not be available. In the 
smart card chips case48 the settlement route was abandoned due to lack of progress. 
The domino effect of the leniency system and the successful use of the settlements procedure 
were both further confirmed by the two cartel cases in the interest rates derivatives industry, 
EIRD49 and YIRD50. Additional ongoing cases linked to the sector will be treated as a 
priority.  
In a smaller case, but one that was also uncovered thanks to the leniency system, the 
Commission fined four North Sea Shrimps traders a little under €30 million in November for 
operating a multi-year cartel in North-Western Europe. 
More information on the cartel decisions mentioned above is available in the sections below, 
describing the relevant sectors. At the same time, the Commission has begun a number of 
other investigations and laid the groundwork for future enforcement. In addition to the 
Statements of Objections in wire harnesses and the EIRD and YIRD cases, which led to the 
                                                            
47 See the section on basic industries and manufacturing 
48 See the section on enforcement in technology markets 
49 Case 39914 Euro Interest Rate Derivatives (EIRD,) Commission decision of 4 December 2013, See 
MEMO/13/1090 of 4 December2013 
50 Case 39861 Yen Interest Rate Derivatives (YIRD), Commission decision of 4 December 2013, See 
MEMO/13/1090 of 4 December2013 
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prohibition decisions mentioned above, the Commission also sent a Statement of Objections 
to the smart card chips producers51 and conducted a number of inspections. 
With four decisions, fines totaling EUR 1 882 975 000, and solid work for enforcement in 
future years, the Commission’s cartel enforcement record remains strong and effective. 
 
Case name Adoption 
date 
Fine imposed 
EUR 
Undertaking
s concerned  
Procedure 
Automotive wire 
harnesses 10/07/2013 141 791 000 5 settlement 
Shrimps 27/11/2013 28 716 000  4 normal 
EIRD 04/12/2013 1 042 749 000 4 settlement 
YIRD 04/12/2013 669 719 000 6 settlement 
 
Antitrust and cartel output 
 
                                                            
51 For further information, see the section on Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) and Media  
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6. Continuing the close cooperation within the European Competition Network 
(ECN) and with national courts  
Regulation 1/2003 empowers the Commission, National Competition Authorities (NCAs) and 
national courts to apply Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to agreements and practices that are 
capable of affecting trade between Member States. Since May 2004, the Commission has 
investigated potential antitrust infringements across almost all sectors of the economy and has 
adopted over 120 decisions, many of which landmark precedents. NCAs have investigated 
more than 1600 cases in this period, giving rise to enforcement decisions in more than 600 
cases. DG COMP and the NCAs continued to coordinate competition enforcement in the ECN 
in 2013. 
Convergence of enforcement powers 
In 2013 the ECN discussed the need to further improve the procedural framework for the 
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Procedures and sanctions for the application of 
the EU competition rules in the Member States are not harmonised by EU law. The 
Commission and NCAs apply the same substantive rules according to different procedures 
and sanctions based on national legislation. Convergence of enforcement powers has been a 
focus of horizontal ECN work for several years. The ECN has notably produced detailed 
comparative reports on investigation and decision making powers52 in 2012. On that basis, a 
set of ECN Recommendations on investigation and decision-making powers were adopted in 
December 201353. As regards sanctions for breaches of competition law, most NCAs can 
impose deterrent administrative fines and calculate those fines based on a similar 
methodology. Reforms leading to more convergence of procedures have been encouraged by 
country specific recommendations in the framework of the Europe 2020 strategy (European 
Semester) and in the context of Economic Adjustment Programmes.  
Leniency convergence and interface with other areas of law   
Leniency programmes are generally recognised as an important tool to detect secret cartels. 
From the outset, the ECN has given priority to fostering convergence and smooth interaction 
in that area. The ECN notably developed the ECN Model Leniency Programme (MLP)54, 
providing Member States and NCAs a cohesive set of rules and procedures from which to 
inspire themselves. Refinements of the MLP were endorsed in late 2012. As a result, virtually 
all Member States have introduced leniency programmes and a significant process of 
alignment with the MLP has taken place by 2013.  
The question of the disclosure of leniency material in the context of civil damages actions55 
was addressed in the Commission's Proposal for a Directive on Actions for Damages of 11 
                                                            
52 The reports are available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/investigative_powers_report_en.pdf and 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/decision_making_powers_report_en.pdf  
53 The ECN recommendations are available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/documents.html  
54 The model set of rules and procedures developed within the ECN are available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/mlp_revised_2012_en.pdf  
55 Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on certain rules governing actions for 
damages under national law for infringements of the competition law provisions of the Member States and of the 
European Union, COM(2013) 404 final, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0404:FIN:EN:PDF 
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June 2013. Some stakeholders pointed out that sanctions on individuals, including classical 
criminal sanctions, applied by a number of MS have an adverse effect on the efficiency of the 
leniency policies. Particular concerns are that leniency does not always apply to individuals, 
or that the leniency options available for businesses and for individuals are not harmonised. 
There is a growing awareness of this issue which has been explicitly addressed by some 
Member States in their legislation or leniency policies.    
Cooperation with national courts 
National courts apply national and EU competition rules in a variety of scenarios. Certain 
national courts have jurisdiction over lawsuits between private parties (e.g. actions for 
damages). Some national courts act as review courts, hearing appeals which are brought 
against decisions of the national competition authorities. There are also courts that act as 
public enforcement authorities. Finally, if national courts apply national competition law, they 
are also required to apply Article 101 TFEU and Article 102 TFEU, where there is an effect 
on trade between Member States.  
Efficient implementation of competition policy requires coherent and consistent judicial 
interpretation. The Commission therefore continues to support the coherent application of 
competition rules through cooperation with national courts. This cooperation includes direct 
case related assistance to national courts when they apply EU competition law. The courts can 
ask the Commission to provide case related information, or to provide an opinion on the 
application of the competition rules. The Commission may also submit amicus curiae 
observations on its own initiative.  
In 2013, the Commission responded to five requests for information and one request for an 
opinion pursuant to Article 15(1) of Regulation 1/2003. The requests for information were 
issued by courts in Spain, the United Kingdom and Belgium. They concerned the state of the 
proceedings before the Commission or the transmission of documents in the possession of the 
Commission. The request for an opinion came from a Spanish court and concerned the 
application of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU to vertical agreements. DG Competition publishes 
opinions issued to national courts as soon as it receives approval from the requesting court.56 
Cooperation on a more general level includes DG Competition's Grant Programme on the 
"Training of National Judges in EU Competition Law". The main aim of the Programme is to 
promote the convergence of competition policy and of enforcement by national courts 
throughout the EU and to boost cross-border exchanges between national judges. In 2013, 
nine projects were awarded totalling almost EUR 800 000. These projects make provision for 
the training of around 720 judges of 26 nationalities in EU competition law and are intended 
to enhance cooperation between them. 
Merger control 
Merger control is an essential component of competition policy enforcement in Europe. 
Efficient merger control contributes to the maintenance of competitive pressure on market 
participants, which stimulates innovation and efficient distribution of scarce resources. In 
order to maintain the recognised high standard of controlling merger transactions, the 
                                                            
56 The Commission's opinions are available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/court/antitrust_requests.html  
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Commission continuously evaluates the substantive and the procedural rules in force. Where 
the Commission identifies room for improvement, it does not hesitate to launch policy 
changes. In 2013 work has progressed on two major policy initiatives in merger control, the 
review of the Merger Regulation and the simplification initiative. 
1. Towards more effective merger control – on-going review 
On 20 June, the Commission published a Staff Working Paper "Towards more effective EU 
merger control"57 in order to seek the views of interested parties on a possible modification of 
the Merger Regulation. 
First, the initiative considers whether to apply merger control rules to deal with the anti-
competitive effects stemming from a new category of transactions, namely acquisitions of 
non-controlling minority shareholdings (hereafter "structural links"). Effective competition 
policy requires having the appropriate means to tackle all sources of harm to competition and 
consumers. Significant harm to competition and consumers can occur not only from 
acquisitions of control, but also from structural links, in particular if minority shareholdings 
are acquired in a competitor or in a vertically related undertaking. 
Until now the Merger Regulation has been limited to “concentrations” defined as acquisitions 
of control and the Commission has only had the possibility to take pre-existing minority 
shareholdings into account if it is competent to analyse the effects of a separate acquisition of 
control. Austria, Germany and the United Kingdom currently have national merger control 
rules that also give them the competence to review structural links. In addition, in a number of 
other countries outside the EU, such as Canada and the United States, structural links are also 
subject to competition review under national merger control rules. 
The Staff Working Paper discusses options to extend EU merger control to the acquisition of 
non-controlling minority shareholdings without creating an undue burden for businesses. This 
could be done either by extending the current ex-ante notification system for “full” mergers to 
minority shareholdings or through a more selective system, whereby the Commission may 
“pick and choose” cases that are most likely to raise competition issues. 
Second, this initiative aims at assessing whether the Merger Regulation should be amended to 
improve the effectiveness and smoothness of the case referral system without fundamentally 
reforming the basic features of this system or the allocation of competences between the 
Commission and Member States. The 2009 Report to the Council on the operation of the 
Merger Regulation58 found that although the existing thresholds and referral mechanisms lead 
to an appropriate allocation of cases in most instances, a significant number of cross border 
cases are still subject to multiple review in several Member States (240 cases in 2007). In 
some cases, where the Commission might have been the more appropriate authority, 
companies may also have opted against a referral to the Commission in order to avoid the 
Commission's jurisdiction for reasons of "forum shopping". To render the case referral system 
                                                            
57 See Commission Staff Working Document: "Towards more effective EU merger control", SWD(2013) 239 
final, available at 
http://www.acceptance.ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_merger_control/index_en.html 
58 See Communication of the 18 June 2009 from the Commission to the Council: "Report on the functioning of 
Regulation No 139/2004, COM(2009) 281 Final, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2009:0281:FIN:EN:PDF 
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between the Member States and the Commission more effective and business-friendly, the 
Staff Working Paper discusses options to streamline pre-notification referrals to the 
Commission under Article 4(5) and post-notification referrals to the Commission under 
Article 22. 
Finally, this initiative also aims to implement, if need be, several possible further technical 
improvements to the Merger Regulation. 
The consultation period ended on 12 September. The Commission received a large number of 
replies from various groups of stakeholders (namely businesses and business associations, law 
firms, lawyers' and other law associations, academia, economic consultancies, international 
organisations, NCAs, national governments and private citizens). The Commission's services 
also met with representatives from EU and EFTA Member States during various meetings and 
conferences. Further progress is envisaged for this initiative in 2014 through the publication 
of a White Paper. 
2. Simplifying merger procedures further – on-going review 
On 5 December, the Commission adopted the 'merger simplification' package. The package 
includes the amendment of the Merger Implementing Regulation59 and the adoption of a new 
Notice on Simplified Procedure60. In parallel, the Commission has updated its model texts for 
divestiture commitments. The Commission's decision followed a public consultation earlier in 
2013.  
The changes aim to make the EU merger review procedures simpler and lighter for 
stakeholders and to save costs. They will also allow the Commission to better focus its 
resources on those merger cases which merit a more intense review. These objectives are 
achieved in three main ways. First, the Commission has extended the scope of application of 
the simplified merger review procedure to cover more cases which are generally unlikely to 
raise competition concerns. In particular, the Commission has raised the market share 
thresholds under which cases qualify for a simplified merger review. Furthermore, it has 
introduced a new category mergers eligible to be considered under the simplified procedure, 
namely those mergers between competitors which result in small increments in market share. 
Second, the Commission has updated and streamlined the information that notifying parties 
are required to include in merger notifications and in pre-notification case referral requests. 
The required information is now more tailoured to the particular type of case being notified. 
Third, the Commission has has made proivision for more focused pre-notification contacts. 
Significant net benefits are expected to ensue for businesses and their external advisorsin 
terms of costs and resources. It is expected that the ratio of cases dealt with in simplified 
procedure will be increased by around 10%. That means that approximately 70% of all cases 
will be simplified (on the basis of the current data).  
                                                            
59 Commission Implementing Regulation (EU) No 1269/2013 of 5 December 2013 amending Regulation (EC) 
No 802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 on the control of concentrations between 
undertakings 
60 Notice on a simplified procedure for treatment of certain mergers under the Merger Regulation 
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For the remaining cases which are reviewed under the normal procedure, the Commission has 
clarified, updated and significantly streamlined the information that the parties need to 
compile for notification. Additionally, the information required from parties requesting a 
referral of a case from the Commission to Member States or vice-versa (the Form RS) has 
been reduced to a strict minimum. 
The streamlining of the information requirements for notification described above is also 
expected to make pre-notification processes in both simplified and non-simplified cases even 
more focused. In individual cases, the information requirements can be further reduced at the 
request of the parties by waivers. The amended texts clarify that waiver requests will be 
assessed within the 5-working day timeframe set out in DG Competition's Best Practices on 
the handling of merger cases61. This is a clear signal of the Commission's willingness to adopt 
a non-formalistic approach in its review and grant such waivers in cases that merit them.  
The simplification initiative is a concrete example of the Commission's commitment towards 
the goals of the Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT) programme62. It makes rules 
and administrative procedures simpler and less burdensome for business, thereby stimulating 
growth and making Europe more competitive.  
3. The number of merger interventions remain stable  
The number of merger notifications in 2013 reflects the average of the last four years. Overall, 
300 cases were notified to the Commission in 2013, including 23 referrals. The Commission 
opened six new in-depth (i.e. second phase) investigations covering several sectors such as IT, 
mobile telephony, air transport and basic industries. 
The number of decisions and the number of interventions63 remains stable (at 15 in 2013) 
compared with the average of the last four years. The number of prohibition decisions 
increased to two in 201364 compared with only one in 201265. In 2013, two decisions66 were 
concluded in second phase with commitments, compared with six in 2012. The number of 
clearance decisions adopted in first phase with commitments remained stable, with eleven in 
2013 compared with nine in 2012. 
The recent trend that transactions become more complex has continued in 2013. Second phase 
investigations in particular generally require sophisticated quantitative and qualitative 
analyses involving large amounts of data. 
                                                            
61 The Best Practices are available at: http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/proceedings.pdf  
62 Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic And 
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, Regulatory Fitness and Performance (REFIT): Results and 
Next Steps, Brussels, 2.10.2013, COM(2013) 685 final, available at http://ec.europa.eu/refit 
63 The term "interventions" in mergers cover prohibition decisions and decisions with commitments. 
64 Case COMP M.6570 UPS / TNT EXPRESS, decision of 30 January 2013 and Case COMP M.6663 RYANAIR / 
AER LINGUS III, decision of 27 February 2013  
65 Case COMP/M.6126 Deutsche Börse/NYSE Euronext, decision of 1 February 2012 
66 Cases COMP/M.6576 Munksjö / Ahlstrom, decision of 24 May 2013 and M.6690 Syniverse / Mach, decision 
of 29 May 2013 
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Merger decisions 
 
4. Significant judgments by EU Courts in mergers 
In 2013 there was one judgment by EU Courts in the area of merger control. On 11 
December, the General Court dismissed Cisco Systems' appeal of a Commission decision of 
October 201167 to clear the acquisition of Skype by Microsoft68. The judgment confirmed the 
Commission's assessment of new markets and technologies under the EU Merger Regulation. 
The Commission's decision to clear the transaction did not put the development of innovative 
products and services at risk. The Commission will continue to ensure that competition in 
nascent and fast evolving markets is maintained. 
Developing the international dimension of EU competition policy 
The proliferation in recent years of jurisdictions with competition legislation and enforcement 
mechanisms is on the one hand a positive development. On the other hand diverging 
competition regimes present a challenge to businesses acting on an international level. The 
Commission seeks to reinforce the role of competition policy in international economic 
cooperation and cooperates with competition agencies globally. Such regulatory and 
enforcement cooperation helps to ensure a level playing field for European companies active 
on global markets. 
                                                            
67 Case M.6281 Microsoft / Skype, Commission decision of 7 December 2011, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_6281  
68 Case T-79/12 Cisco Systems, Inc. and Messagenet SpA v Commission, judgment of 11 December 2013 
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1. Bilateral relations 
The EU launched negotiations with the US on a Transatlantic Trade and Investment 
Partnership Agreement (TTIP) on 8 July. The agreement has a competition chapter that will 
include provisions covering antitrust, mergers, State-owned enterprises, and subsidies. The 
high-level bilateral policy dialogue in the framework of the cooperation agreement69 
continued in 2013. Discussions with the US federal competition authorities aim, among other 
things, to improve cooperation in the area of unilateral conduct, mergers and airline alliances.  
Negotiations on a Free Trade Agreement were also started with Japan on 25 March. The 
proposed agreement includes competition provisions which DG Competition is following 
closely. DG Competition also met representatives of the Japanese competition agency in 
accordance with the existing cooperation agreement70.  
On 17 May, the EU signed a second generation Cooperation Agreement with Switzerland71. It 
includes an innovative feature that will enable the competition agencies to exchange 
information they have obtained in their investigations. Negotiations on a similar agreement 
between the EU and Canada have been progressing well. 
A new Memorandum of Understanding for Cooperation in the area of competition law (MoU) 
was signed on 22 November with the Competition Commission of India.72 The MoU sends a 
positive signal for intensified cooperation on competition matters between the EU and India.  
The European Commission continued negotiating Free Trade Agreements with a large 
number of third countries, all of which include a chapter on competition. In addition, the 
Commission continued to engage in technical cooperation activities with other non-EU 
competition authorities, in particular with the Chinese and Indian competition authorities. 
In the framework of the accession negotiations, significant progress was made in 2013 with 
the screening of Montenegrin legislation and the identification of opening benchmarks for 
negotiations of the competition chapter. The Commission continued to closely monitor the 
implementation of the steel and shipbuilding protocol included in the Accession Treaty for 
Croatia.  
2. Multilateral cooperation 
The Commission also continued its active engagement in competition related international 
fora such as the Competition Committee of the OECD, the International Competition Network 
(ICN) and Unctad. In 2013, it continued co-chairing the Mergers Working Group of ICN and 
one of the Sub-Groups of the Cartel Working Group. In 2013, the Commission was the 
                                                            
69 Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Commission of the European 
Communities regarding the application of their competition laws - Exchange of interpretative letters with the 
Government of the United States of America, OJ L 095, 27.04.1995, p. 47 
70 Agreement between the European Community and the Government of Japan concerning cooperation on anti-
competitive activities, OJ L 183, 22.7.2003, p. 12 
71 For further information see press release: IP/13/444 of 17/5/2013, available at  http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-444_en.htm 
72 For further information see press release: IP/13/1143 of 21/11/2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-
release_IP-13-1143_en.htm  
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project leader (together with US FTC) for the Steering Group projects on investigative 
processes in competition enforcement activities 
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II. SECTORAL OVERVIEW 
This section provides an overview of policy developments and enforcement activities in a 
number of selected sectors, which the Commission particularly focused on in 2013: energy 
and environment, ICT and media, financial services, manufacturing, the agri-food industry, 
pharmaceutical and health services and transport. 
 1. ENERGY & ENVIRONMENT 
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
The energy sector is of significant importance to the EU, as energy is a key input across all 
economic sectors. Affordable energy prices and security of supply are vital for a competitive 
European industry. While some progress has been made towards the three central goals of the 
European energy policy, that is competitiveness, sustainability and security of supply, several 
challenges remain.  
Challenges facing European competitiveness, sustainability and security of supply 
 
The Commission's communication "A policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 
2030"73 is a comprehensive framework aiming to make the Euroepan Union's economy and energy system more 
competitive, secure and sustainable. The most important challenges include the reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions, the combat against climate change, maintaining secure and reliable provision of energy at competitive 
prices, reducing our dependence on energy imports and improving interconnection between European gas and 
electricity grids. The Commission's Communication "Energy 2020 – A strategy for competitive, sustainable and 
secure energy"74 calls for action in several areas, such as energy efficiency, infrastructure, choice and security 
for consumers, energy technology and the external dimension of the internal energy market. The Commission's 
Communication "Energy Technologies and Innovation"75 calls for particular actions to bring new, high 
performance low-cost, low-carbon sustainable energy technologies to the sector. Competition enforcement and 
advocacy, along with sector-specific legislative proposals, constitute the main tools the Commission has at its 
disposal to achieve these goals and create a single European energy market by the 2020 target date. Given the 
strategic importance of the energy sector, the European Parliament, in its Resolution on the 2012 report on 
competition policy (the Tremosa i Balcells report) continued to request that the Commission actively monitors 
the degree of competition on the market. 
The three key challenges identified in 2013 are the EU's increasing dependence on imported 
energy, increasing energy prices and lack of investment.76 EU energy markets still do not 
function efficiently, as markets remain segmented along national borders, investments in 
infrastructure is lacking and access to networks remains difficult for new entrants. In 2013, 
EU competition policy contributed to tackling those challenges in several ways. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Enhancing competitiveness across the energy sector 
                                                            
73 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/2030/docs/com_2014_15_en.pdf  
74 Available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2010:0639:FIN:EN:HTML 
75 Available at http://ec.europa.eu/energy/technology/strategy/doc/comm_2013_0253_en.pdf  
76 See Commission contribution to the European Council of 22 May 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/energy2_en.pdf 
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Competition enforcement and advocacy in the energy sector contribute to competitiveness of 
EU industry in general and the completion of the Single Market. It does so in particular by 
opening energy markets, creating a level playing field between competitors, preventing 
incumbents from reinforcing their dominant positions and creating a framework for 
investment that avoids distortions and ensures the efficient allocation of public resources.  
The competitiveness of European industry is affected by energy prices that are higher in the 
EU than in other major trading partners. Antitrust enforcement actions have contributed to 
curbing energy prices by combatting the segmentation of markets, inefficient allocation of 
energy and abusive or collusive behaviour. Cases investigated in 2013 include an examination 
of the behaviour of companies active in the crude oil, refined oil products and biofuel 
sectors;77 Gazprom, in relation to the supply of gas to Central and Eastern Europe78; BEH, in 
relation to the supply of electricity in Bulgaria79; and power exchanges80.  
Industrial competitiveness is also addressed by the State aid Guidelines on the Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS) which entered into force on 1 January 2013. Member States can 
relieve energy-intensive industries from indirect costs of CO2 in their electricity price. Such 
measures address the risk of relocation of energy-intensive industries to countries outside the 
EU where environmental regulation is less strict.81 During 2013, the Commission approved 
such schemes in five Member States.82 On the other hand, plans of the German authorities to 
grant such support to certain non-ferrous metals producers have been declared incompatible, 
as it would have entailed serious distortions of competition to the detriment of producers in 
other Member States.83 
Furthermore, to enhance competition and ensure a level playing field in the energy sector, the 
Commission has initiated several in-depth investigations in State aid. The cases concern either 
electricity generators or selective and potentially distortive advantages to electricity 
consumers. In particular, the Commission has launched an investigation to examine the role of 
aid in preventing market opening in the Portuguese electricity generation market84 and it re-
opened an inquiry into certain tax measures granted by the French State to Electricité de 
France (EDF)85. In-depth probes were also launched in Germany86, Denmark87 and the UK88. 
                                                            
77 Case AT.40054 Oil and Biofuel Markets, see MEMO/13/435 of 14 May 2013  
78Case AT.39816 Upstream Gas Supplies in Central and Eastern Europe, see MEMO/12/937 of 4 September 
2012 
79 Case AT.39767 BEH electricity, see IP/121307 of 3 December 2012 
80 Case AT.39952 Power Exchanges, see MEMO12/78 of 7 February 2012 
81 Guidelines on certain State aid measures in the context of the greenhouse gas emission allowance trading 
scheme post 2012, OJ C154, 5 June 2012, p. 4 
82 Belgium, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and the UK, respectively case numbers SA.37017, SA.36103, 
SA.37084, SA.36650 and SA.35543 
83 SA.30068 Aid to non-ferrous metals producers for CO2 costs of electricity, see IP/13/704 of 17 July 2013 
84 SA.35429 Extension of use of public water resources for hydro electricity generation, see IP/13/842 of 18 
September 2013 
85 SA.13869 EDF: Requalification en capital des provisions comptables en franchise d’impôt pour le 
renouvellement du Réseau d’Alimentation Générale. This followed a judgment handed down by the Court of 
Justice of the European Union in Case C-124/10 P. 
86 SA.34045 Exemption from network charges for large electricity consumers ($19 StromNEV) and SA.33995 
Reduction of the EEG-surcharge for energy intensive users and support of RES electricity 
87 SA.32184 Alleged State aid to an electricity supplier and SA.32669 Aid granted to CHP plants and an 
electricity supplier which affect the market for regulation power 
88 SA.34947 Electricity Market Reform – Investment Contract (early Contract for Difference) for the Hinkley 
Point C New Nuclear Power Station 
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Contributing to sustainability 
Sustainable development is the long-term use of resources to meet human needs, while 
preserving the environment. Sustainability was at the heart of the measures reviewed under 
the State aid rules, under which the Commission authorised aid that supports renewable 
energy sources and environmentally friendly businesses.  
During 2013, based on the provisions of the Environmental Aid Guidelines89, the Commission 
issued a great number of approval decisions for the promotion of renewable energy.90 The 
Commission is currently revising those Guidelines, with a view of adopting modernised rules 
in 2014. The revision will adapt the rules in light of their application and market 
developments. It will allow Member States to design support schemes to reach the EU 
objectives and help companies to better bear the costs relating to the support of electricity 
from renewable energy sources and contribute to increased environmental protection and 
growth. The revised guidelines will therefore also consider negative impacts of 
environmentally harmful subsidies, while taking into account the need to address trade-offs 
between different areas and policies as recognised by the flagship initiative for "Resource-
efficient Europe". 
The Czech Republic notified five individual aid measures in the steel sector within an overall 
aid scheme for improving air quality in the Moravia-Silesia Region. The Commission came to 
the conclusion that the measures proposed would increase the level of environmental 
protection by going beyond the mandatory obligation that can be imposed on the beneficiary 
based on applicable Community standards under Directive 2010/75/EU on industrial 
emissions and they were approved on this basis.91 
Enforcement actions supporting sustainability include the on-going anti-trust investigation in 
relation to the Austrian waste management markets92. The Commission’s intervention will 
contribute to achieving more efficient ways of collecting and recovering packaging waste and 
help achieving environmental targets. 
Contributing to security of supply 
                                                            
89 Community guidelines on State aid for environmental protection, OJ C 82, 1.4.2008, p. 1. 
90 For instance, SA.35073 – Belgium - Reduced excise duties for sustainable biofuels; SA.35089 – Denmark - 
Supplement for electricity from new wind turbines; SA.33567 – Finland - Production aid for electricity from 
renewable energy sources in Åland; SA.34889 – Germany - Scheme for the promotion of energy-efficiency and 
the use of renewable energy in the sectors of commerce and industry; SA.35767 – Hungary - Replacing the 
existing excise duty exemption for biofuel E85 with an excise duty reduction; SA.35079 – Ireland - RES-E 
Support Programme; SA.36516 – the Netherlands - Aid for wind farm Zuidermeerdijk; SA.35414 – Sweden - 
Changes in the Swedish Energy taxation regarding biofuels for low-blending; SA.35565 – UK - Amendments to 
the Renewables Obligation scheme.  
91 SA.35597 – Czech Republic - Reduction of emissions by up-grading dedusting system of sinter plant south of 
ArcelorMittal Ostrava a.s.; SA.35598 – Czech Republic - Reduction of fugitive emissions from sinter handling 
and cooling at sinter plant south of ArcelorMittal Ostrava a.s.; SA.35599 – Czech Republic – Arcelor Mittal 
Ostrava a.s. – Reduction of fugitive emissions from VP3 foundries; SA.35600 – Czech Republic – Třinecké 
železárny, a.s. –   De-dusting of waste gases and de-dusting of junctions at sintering plant 2 and SA.35600 – 
Czech Republic – Třinecké železárny, a.s. –  De-dusting of waste gases and de-dusting of junctions at sintering 
plant 2 
92 Case AT.39759 ARA foreclosure, , see IP/13/711 of 18 July 2013 
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The EU energy sector is increasingly dependent on imports and dependency is expected to 
grow to more than 80% in the case of oil and gas by 2035. However, energy dependency 
differs greatly among Member States. Some Member States rely on one single supplier and 
often on one single supply route for 80%-100% of their gas consumption,93 whereas Member 
States with a diverse portfolio of gas suppliers and supply routes and with well-developed gas 
markets reap the benefit by paying less for imports. The EU energy sector is also 
characterized by a significant need for investments, e.g. in electricity generation 
infrastructure, given the trend for gas and renewables to contribute more to electricity 
generation in the EU.  
With the aim of encouraging investment, the Commission authorised in 2013 State aid for a 
number of gas infrastructure projects (in Greece94 and Poland95) as well as investments into 
Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) infrastructure (in Greece and Lithuania96). At the same time, in 
the field of merger control, the Commission cleared a number of transactions involving 
investments into European energy infrastructure by companies which are new to this market 
(e.g. investment funds, trading companies and industry conglomerates). Many of these 
investments focussed on the production of electricity from renewable energy sources (e.g. 
wind parks97, solar parks98, waste-to-energy99 or biodiesel100) as well as on investments into 
transmission systems (e.g. off-shore electricity transmission,101 off-shore gas transmission102 
and on-shore gas-transmission103).  
Similarly, the Commission's anti-trust enforcement aims at resolving security of supply issues 
by facilitating access to the market and encouraging investment. That is illustrated by the 
decision regarding CEZ electricity104, the investigations into BEH in relation to Bulgarian gas 
market105, into the Romanian power exchange106 and into Gazprom107 in relation to the 
partitioning of markets and the prevention of diversification of the supply of gas.  
The Commission has also remained vigilant to maintain competitive market structures when it 
assessed proposed merger transactions. In that spirit the Commission cleared the acquisition 
of joint control over WINZ and Wintershall Services of the Netherlands and sole control over 
                                                            
93 See Commission contribution to the European Council, Energy challenges and policy, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/europe2020/pdf/energy2_en.pdf  
94 SA.35164 Compressor Station in Nea Messimvria; SA.35166 High pressure natural gas pipeline to Aliveri; 
SA.35167 High pressure natural gas pipeline to Ag Theodori – Megalopoli; and SA.35976 Metering/Regulating 
stations  
95 SA.34982 Individual aid to Gas-System S.A.; SA.34235 Gas pipeline Rembelszczyzna-Gustorzyn; SA.34938 
Gas storage Husów 
96 SA.35165 1st upgrade LNG terminal at Revithoussa and SA.35977 2nd Upgrade of LNG Terminal in 
Revithoussa and SA.36740 “Klaipėdos nafta“ (hereinafter – „KN“) 
97 Case M.6870 GE / Munich RE / Iberdrola Renovables France; M.7046 Parkwind / Summit Renewable Energy 
Belwind 1 / Belwind, 
98 Case M.6864 DSE/INCJ/Solar Ventures/JV 
99 Case M.6820 Eqt Infrastructure II/E.On Energy From Waste  
100 Case M.6807 BUNGE GROUP / MBF / NOVAOL AUSTRIA 
101 Case M.6875 TENNET OFFSHORE / MITSUBISHI CORPORATION / TENNET OFFSHORE 8 
102 Case M.7039 PGGM / GDF SUEZ / EBN / NOGAT 
103 Case M.6887 SNAM / GICSI / TIGF; M.6925 ALLIANZ GROUP / OMERS GROUP / NET4GAS  
104 Case AT.39727 CEZ, see IP/13/320 of 10 April 2013 
105 Case AT.39849 BEH Gas, see IP/13/656 of 5 July 2012  
106 Case AT.38884 OPCOM/Romanian Power Exchange, see IP/13/486 of 30 May 2013. 
107 Case AT.39816 Upstream Gas Supplies in Central and Eastern Europe, see MEMO/12/937 of 4 September 
2012. 
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Wingas and WIEH of Germany by the Russian energy company Gazprom108. The 
Commission assessed the potential impact of the transaction on competition in the markets for 
the sale of gas in Germany, Austria and the Czech Republic, where Gazprom sells gas to 
downstream wholesalers and retailers, including Wingas which is both wholesaler and 
retailer. The Commission also assessed the potential effects of the acquisition on competition 
in the markets for the storage of gas in Germany and Austria. The Commission concluded that 
the transaction would not raise competition concerns as it would not allow Gazprom to restrict 
customers' access to gas supplies. 
 2. INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION TECHNOLOGIES (ICT) AND MEDIA  
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
Information and Communication Technologies (“ICT”) play a key enabling role for Europe to 
achieve its strategic objectives under the Europe 2020 Strategy, in particular, as regards the 
objectives under the Digital Agenda flagship initiative109 and the revised priorities adopted in 
December 2012110. That role is also recognised in the Communication on e-commerce and 
other online services.111 Creative content is an essential input into the digital economy and a 
key driver of consumer demand for digital services. Europe’s sustainable competitiveness 
largely depends on its ability to absorb the potential benefits of the rapid progress in ICT. 
ICT increasingly affects all segments of society and the economy. It is estimated that half of 
all productivity growth derives from investment in ICT112. There is a very considerable 
growth potential in those sectors. In mature economies, internet-related expenditure and 
consumption accounted for 21% of GDP growth during the past five years.113 There are more 
than 4 million ICT workers across many sectors in Europe and their number is growing by 3% 
annually despite the crisis. The internet is empowering people to create and share their ideas, 
giving rise to new content, entrepreneurs and markets. ICT is the essential transformative 
technology that supports structural change in sectors like health care, energy, public services, 
and education. 
In light of the rapid technological developments which characterise those sectors, effective 
competition policy and enforcement are essential to address potential malfunctioning in the 
ICT and media sectors. 
                                                            
108 Case M.6910 GAZPROM / WINTERSHALL / TARGET COMPANIES, decision of 4 december 2013,  
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_6910  
109 A Digital Agenda for Europe, Brussels, 26 August 2010, COM(2010) 245 final/2., available at: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52010DC0245R%2801%29:EN:NOT  
110 The Digital Agenda for Europe - Driving European growth digitally, Brussels, 18 December 2012, 
COM(2012) 784 final, available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2012:0784:FIN:EN:PDF  
111 A coherent framework for building trust in the Digital Single Market for e-commerce and online services, 
Brussels, 11 January 2012, COM (2011) 942 final, available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2011:0942:FIN:EN:PDF  
112 The Digital Agenda for Europe - Driving European growth digitally, Brussels, 18.12.2012, COM(2012) 784 
final. 
113 McKinsey Global Institute, “Internet Matters: The Net’s Sweeping Impact on Growth, Jobs, and Prosperity” 
(May 2011) as quoted in an Issues Note on the Digital Economy by the OECD Secretariat (Competition 
Committee) (DAF/COMP(2011)16) 
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Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Competition policy contributed to key initiatives to boost a European single market for 
electronic communication and proposals in the media sector 
Competition policy played an important role in shaping the Commission’s legislative 
proposals in the telecom and media sectors in the course of 2013.  
On 11 September, the Commission adopted a legislative package for a "Connected Continent: 
Building a Telecoms Single Market". This package comprises a proposal for a Regulation 
laying down measures concerning the European single market for electronic communications 
and to achieve a Connected Continent and a Commission Recommendation on consistent non-
discrimination obligations and costing methodologies to promote competition and enhance the 
broadband investment environment, as well as a Communication on the Telecoms Single 
Market. The package contains a number of safeguards aimed at ensuring compliance with EU 
competition law. 
On 5 November, the European Parliament and the Council agreed in principle on the 
Commission’s proposal for a Directive on collective rights management. The proposed 
measures aim to modernise collecting societies that are responsible for the licensing of 
copyright-protected music for online use on behalf of the authors. The proposal also contains 
a number of important competition law safeguards, built on the Commission's enforcement 
experience, including the CISAC decision, which was largely upheld by the General Court in 
in April.114 The safeguards aim at ensuring compliance with EU competition law in the 
collective management of copyright. 
Moreover, on 13 November, the Commission adopted a new Communication on State aid for 
films and other audio-visual works.115 This new Communication extends the scope of the 
preceding Cinema Communication. In particular, it allows aid for a wider scope of activities, 
reinforces Member States' discretion in defining cultural activities worthy of support, 
introduces a higher aid intensity level for cross-border productions and promotes film 
heritage. The new Communication also ensures that territorial obligations imposed on film 
producers, which are in potential conflict with internal market principles, are more 
proportional to the aid granted. 
Enforcement action in the telecoms sector 
The Commission continued to pursue enforcement actions against telecommunication 
operators suspected of engaging in anti-competitive conduct. 
On 23 January, the Commission imposed fines of EUR 66 894 000 on Telefónica and EUR 12 
290 000 on Portugal Telecom116, as it concluded that their agreement not to compete in the 
Iberian telecommunications markets was in breach of Article 101 TFEU. This case is a good 
                                                            
114 Commission Decision C(2008) 3435 final of 16th July 2008  in case COMP/C2/38.698 – CISAC; and 
judgments of the General Court of 12 April 2013, in Cases T-392/08, T-398/08, T-401/08, T-410/08, T-411/08, 
T-413/08 to T-422/08, T-425/08, T-428/08, T-432/08, T-433/08, T-434/08, T-442/08, T-451/08, not yet reported. 
115 Communication from the Commission on State aid for films and other audiovisual works, OJ 2013 C 332 of 
15 November 2013, p. 1-11 
116 Case AT-39839 Telefónica and Portugal Telecom, decision of 23 January 2013. 
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example of the Commission's tough stance against anti-competitive agreements having as 
their object or effect the compartmentalisation of the internal market along national borders. 
The Commission continued to advance its case against Slovak Telekom and its parent 
company, Deutsche Telekom117, following the Statement of Objections (SO) issued in May 
2012. In the SO, the Commission took the preliminary view that Slovak Telekom may have 
abused its dominant position in certain wholesale broadband markets in Slovakia. In 
particular, Slovak Telekom may have refused to supply unbundled access to its local loops 
and wholesale services to competitors, and may have imposed a margin squeeze on alternative 
operators. Broadband access plays a key role in the competitiveness of the European digital 
economy.  
Enforcement linked to digitisation 
The Commission continued in 2013 to pursue enforcement actions related to the impact of the 
transition to digital networks. 
The transition from analogue to digital terrestrial broadcasting has a positive digital dividend. 
To ensure that this dividend leads to new entry and broader viewer choice it has to be 
allocated subject to specific conditions (e.g. open, transparent and non-discriminatory 
procedures), required by EU law118. In 2013, following interventions by the Commission, 
France amended its broadcasting regulations. By contrast, the Commission considered 
measures proposed by Bulgaria to address the distortions as insufficient and on 24 January 
decided to refer Bulgaria to the Court.119 The Commission is also closely monitoring steps 
taken by Italy to assign new digital frequencies (multiplexes) to new entrants or smaller TV 
operators. 
In June, the Commission concluded its investigation in relation to the public financing of the 
digital terrestrial infrastructure in Spain. The measures at stake included granting State aid 
for the transition to digital terrestrial television in remote areas. The public financing also 
encompassed aid for the operation and maintenance of the digital terrestrial infrastructure. 
However, those subsidies worth EUR 260 million went exclusively to terrestrial operators 
and alternative digital transmission platforms, such as satellite, cable or the Internet, could 
not effectively benefit from the subsidies. Therefore, the Spanish measure unduly distorts 
competition between DTT players and operators using other technologies. As a result, the 
Commission concluded that aid was incompatible with EU State aid rules and adopted a final 
negative decision120 with recovery obligation. 
The Commission also completed its antitrust proceedings into alleged anti-competitive 
practices by five international publishers and Apple affecting the sale of e-books in the EEA, 
by adopting a second121 Article 9 commitment decision addressed to Penguin Random House. 
                                                            
117 Case AT.39523 Slovak Telekom 
118 Including Commission Directive 2002/77/EC of 16 September 2002 on competition in the markets for 
electronic communications networks and services, OJ L249, 17 September 2002, p. 21. 
119 See IP/13/46 of 24 January 2013. 
120 Case SA.28599 – Aid for the deployment of digital terrestrial television (DTT) - Spain, decision of 19 June 
2013. 
121 Case AT.39847 Ebooks, decision of 25 July 2013. The decision follows the first Article 9 commitment 
decision of December 2012, by which the Commission made legally binding commitments offered by Apple and 
 36 
 
The Commission suspected that, by jointly switching the sale of e-books from a wholesale 
model to an agency model with the same key terms on a global basis (first in the US and then 
in the EEA), the publishers, together with Apple, may have engaged in a concerted practice 
with the object of raising retail prices of e-books in the EEA or preventing the emergence of 
lower prices in the EEA for e-books. The Commission closed its proceedings against Penguin 
after the latter proposed essentially the same commitments as the other four publishers, i.e. (a) 
the termination of agency agreements, (b) a 5 year ban on price MFN (most-favoured-
customer) clauses, and (c) a 2 year "cooling-off" period during which retailers will have the 
right to discount e-books even if under an agency arrangement. With the commitments the 
potential infringement ended and conditions were created to allow for a competitive reset as 
quickly as possible in that nascent and fast-moving market. 
Finally, the Commission continued to advance its 2012 fact-finding investigation to examine 
whether licensing agreements for pay-TV content contain absolute territorial protection 
clauses. Such clauses may breach Article 101 TFEU by preventing consumers from accessing 
content across borders. 122 
Enforcement in technology markets 
The Commission's enforcement action in technology markets is mainly focused on unilateral 
conduct, potentially in breach of Article 102 TFEU. 
Protecting consumer's interest on the Internet 
One of the key Commission enforcement actions in the ICT sector is the on-going investigation concerning 
Google's business practices in the markets for online search, online search advertising (Google's relationship 
with advertisers) and online search advertising intermediation (Google's relationship with website owners, 
known as "publishers"). The Commission has identified four business practices by Google that may constitute an 
abuse of a dominant position: (i) the preferential treatment of Google's own vertical search services to the 
detriment of competing vertical search services (including on mobile devices); (ii) the copying of third party 
content for use in Google's own vertical search services; (iii) exclusivity agreements with publishers for search 
advertising; and (iv) restrictions on the portability and management of search advertising campaigns across 
search advertising platforms. Google submitted a first set of commitments in April and a revised set of 
commitments in October. The Commission sought feedback on Google's revised commitments through formal 
requests for information. In light of the feedback it has received, the Commission has come to the conclusion 
that the revised commitments still fall short of adequately addressing the competition concerns the Commission 
expressed in its Preliminary Assessment and has informed Google of this conclusion. The Commission has also 
informed Google that if it wishes to submit a further revised set of commitments that adequately addresses the 
Commission's concerns, it has only a very limited amount of time to do so, failing which the Commission will 
revert to the procedure under Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003. 
The Commission continued in 2013 its investigations in relation to the enforcement of 
standard essential patents ("SEPs") in the Samsung and Apple/Motorola cases. SEPs are 
patents essential for the implementation of an industry standard and for which companies 
committed to license the patents on fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory ("FRAND") 
terms. 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
the other four international publishers involved, namely, Simon & Schuster, HarperCollins, Hachette and 
Holtzbrinck/Macmillan 
122 The fact-finding followed the Premier League/Murphy judgment, Joined Cases C-403/08 and C-429/08, 
judgment of 4 October 2011.  
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The Samsung case concerns the compatibility with Article 102 TFEU of Samsung's 
enforcement of its mobile communications SEPs by means of injunctions against Apple 
before various national courts in the EEA. Following the issuance of a Statement of 
Objections in December 2012, in September 2013 Samsung offered commitments to address 
the competition concerns identified by the Commission. Under the proposed commitments, 
Samsung essentially commits not to seek injunctions in the EEA on the basis of its 
smartphone and tablet SEPs for a period of five years if potential licensees agree to comply 
with a specified process for determining appropriate FRAND royalty rates. The Commission 
has market-tested these commitments and is taking account of the feedback it has received in 
discussing with Samsung possible improvements to the commitments. If at the end of these 
discussions, the Commission reaches the conclusion that Samsung’s commitments adequately 
address the Commission’s competition concerns, the Commission may make the 
commitments binding on Samsung by the adoption of a decision under Article 9 of Regulation 
1/2003. 
The Motorola case concerns the compatibility with Article 102 TFEU of Motorola Mobility's 
seeking an enforcement of an injunction in Germany against Apple on the basis of one of 
Motorola's mobile communications SEPs. The Commission issued a Statement of Objections 
in May and is currently examining the observations received on the Statement of Objections.  
The Commission continues to be vigilant in other areas of the IT and internet sector as well. 
On 6 March, the Commission adopted a decision imposing a EUR561 million fine on 
Microsoft for failing to comply with its commitment to offer users a browser choice screen 
enabling them to easily choose their preferred web browser. That commitment had been made 
legally binding on Microsoft in December 2009 to address competition concerns related to the 
tying of Microsoft's web browser, Internet Explorer, to its dominant client PC operating 
system, Windows. Microsoft committed to make available for five years (i.e. until 2014) in 
the European Economic Area a "choice screen". This screen would allow users of Windows to 
choose in an informed and unbiased manner which web browser(s) they wanted to install in 
addition to, or instead of, Microsoft's web browser. The Commission found that Microsoft 
failed to roll out the browser choice screen with its Windows 7 Service Pack 1 from May 
2011 until July 2012. As a consequence, at least 15 million Windows users in the EU did not 
see the choice screen during this period. Microsoft has acknowledged that the choice screen 
was not displayed during that time and has not appealed the decision.  
The Commission also sent a Statement of Objections regarding an alleged cartel in smart card 
chips. The Commission initially explored the possibility of a settlement with certain 
companies allegedly involved in the cartel but discontinued the talks due to lack of progress. 
Therefore, the normal antitrust procedure will now run its course. Almost everybody uses 
smart card chips, be it in mobile phone SIM cards, bank cards, passports, identity cards, Pay 
TVs or in numerous other applications. The Commission has concerns that certain chips 
suppliers may have agreed or coordinated their behaviour in the European Economic Area 
(EEA) in order to keep prices up.  
ICT in the context of merger control 
Finally, through the Merger Regulation, the Commission ensures that the ICT and media 
sectors remain competitive and open for new entrants, and that access to key elements 
(whether content, technology or interconnection) is not denied. The Commission also aims at 
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ensuring that consumers do not suffer from higher prices, less choice, poorer quality and 
limited innovation as a result of mergers in that sector. 
Significant merger activity in the telecommunication sector continued in 2013. The 
Commission reviewed a number of high profile transactions in this sector, including Liberty 
Global's USD 23.3 billion acquisition of Virgin Media123, the largest cable operator in the 
United Kingdom and Vodafone's EUR 8 billion acquisition of Kabel Deutschland124, the 
largest cable operator in Germany. Both these transactions were ultimately cleared 
unconditionally by the Commission in phase I.  The Liberty/ Virgin case is a cross-border 
expansion by one telecom operator in another Member State (indeed, Liberty Global was 
essentially not present at the retail level in the United Kingdom prior to the Virgin Media 
acquisition). The Vodafone/ Kabel Deutschland case is an expansion by one operator into one 
or more sectors in which its activities were previously limited within the same Member State 
(indeed, prior to the Kabel Deutschland acquisition, Vodafone's activities in Germany were 
mainly focused on mobile communications). 
Another significant transaction in the telecoms industry was the acquisition of most of 
Nokia's devices & services business (D&S) by Microsoft. The D&S business mainly 
produces and sells smartphones and feature phones. The Commission concluded that the 
transaction would not raise any competition concerns, in particular because there are only 
modest overlaps between the parties' activities and the links between Microsoft's mobile 
operating systems, mobile applications and enterprise mail server software with Nokia's 
smart mobile devices are unlikely to lead to competitors being shut out from the market. 
The Commission, however, is in the process of reviewing two transactions entailing a four-to-
three consolidation between Mobile Network Operators ("MNOs"). They are active within the 
same Member States, namely Ireland and Germany. In the first case, on 1 October, Hutchison 
3G UK notified to the Commission its intention to acquire sole control over Telefónica 
Ireland125 and on 6 November, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation into that 
transaction. In the second case, on 31 October, Telefónica Deutschland notified to the 
Commission its intention to acquire sole control over KPN's mobile operations in Germany 
(trading as E-Plus) 126 and on 20 December, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation 
of the transaction. As those cases would result in the reduction in the number of players in 
markets (both the wholesale access market and the retail market) that are already very 
concentrated, the Commission will carry out in-depth investigations in the course of 2014. 
 3. FINANCIAL SERVICES 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
Financial services represent about 5% of the EU’s GDP but, more importantly, they play an 
essential role in the economy in transforming short-term savings into long-term lending and 
directing capital where it is most needed. In 2013, for the first time since the outset of the 
financial and economic crisis, the instability surrounding the financial sector showed signs of 
                                                            
123 Case M.6880 Liberty Global / Virgin Media, decision of 15 April 2013 
124 Case M.6990 Vodafone / Kabel Deutschland, decision of 20 September 2013 
125 Case M.6992 Hutchison 3G UK / Telefónica Ireland, decision of 6 November 2013 
126 Case M.7018 Telefónica Deutschland / E-Plus, decision of 20 December 2013 
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improvement across the EU. The Commission has continued to apply its State aid regime for 
the financial sector with the aim to ensure that aided financial institutions restructure 
adequately to become viable again, to deal with the distortions of competition created by the 
aid received while at the same time maintaining financial stability, safeguarding the internal 
market and protecting the interests of taxpayers. At the same time, the Commission continued 
its antitrust enforcement action, with the aim of making the financial services markets 
function better.   
Furthermore, since its launch in June last year, the project to achieve a "Banking Union" is 
right on top of Europe’s agenda127. While it is still incomplete to date, progress is moving fast 
on different fronts: 
• As from January 2014, European banks will apply the new rules set out in the so-
called CRD (Capital requirements Directive) IV package, which implements Basel III. 
Insufficient level of capital – both in quantity and in quality – was one of the 
vulnerabilities shown by banking institutions during the crisis; the new capital 
adequacy rules of the CRD IV will address that shortcoming. 
• In December 2013, the EU co-legislators reached a political agreement to revise the 
EU directive on Deposit Guarantee Schemes ("DGS") with the aim to harmonise the 
set-up and functioning of the Member States' national deposit guarantee schemes and 
to ensure they are provided with adequate funds. 
• As of November 2014, a Single Supervisory Mechanism (“SSM”) for euro-area banks 
will be fully operational. The European Central Bank will become the single banking 
supervisor for the euro area countries and for all those that decide to join the Banking 
Union. 
• In December 2013, co-legislators also agreed on a text of a new European directive on 
Banking Recovery and Resolution which will provide a common tool-box for 
resolving banks in difficulties. This legislation aims at better protecting taxpayers 
from having to bail-out banks in distress. 
• A Single Resolution Mechanism applicable to the euro area and to other countries 
willing to join will, in all likelihood, be adopted by the time the SSM becomes fully 
operational. 
To prepare for those changes, the Commission reviewed its State aid banking guidelines128 in 
2013, updating the crisis framework put in place five years before. This update of the State 
aid crisis rules intends to ensure that future State interventions are consistent with the key 
principles of the Banking Union. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Contributing to seamless, efficient and innovative payment markets 
                                                            
127 In his annual State of the Union speech to the European Parliament on September 11, President Barroso 
described it as “the first and most urgent phase on the way to deepen our economic and monetary union". 
128 Communication from the Commission on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid rules to support 
measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis ('Banking Communication'),  
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Competition policy contributes to the well-functioning of financial markets with incentives 
for market participants to improve efficiency and meet consumer needs. Combined with well-
designed regulation, enforcement of competition policy enhances transparency and reduces 
entry barriers for new technology and new players.  
Seamless, efficient and innovative payment markets are essential for the internal market. 
Regulation, self-regulation and competition enforcement must work together to create SEPA 
("Single Euro Payments Area"), with open, efficient and innovative market structures. In 
2013, the Commission has continued to make significant progress in all three areas. 
As a follow up to the Green Paper on cards, internet and mobile payments published for 
consultation in early 2012, at the end of July the Commission adopted a regulatory package 
including a proposal to revise the Directive on Payment Services (“PSD”)129 and a proposal 
for regulation on interchange fees for card based payments.130 In both cases, legislation 
follows in the footsteps of antitrust enforcement. Both proposals are aimed at addressing the 
barriers to the proper functioning of the Single Market and to competition in payments. The 
proposed revised PSD will cater for non-bank players in internet and card payments to operate 
in competition with banks by providing for regulated access to information on availability of 
funds in the bank account, while at the same time ensuring security and data protection by all 
players. The proposal for regulation on interchange fees includes caps on interchange fees for 
consumer credit and debit cards and measures to increase transparency and to empower 
consumer and retailers to make informed choices. 
Self-regulation has played an important role in payments: the European Payments Council, 
which consists of credit and payment institutions and the SEPA Council, created to represent 
all stakeholders, are engaged in that field. However, the roles and decision-making powers of 
EPC and SEPA Council remain controversial. In the SEPA Regulation131, the European 
Parliament required a review of the governance arrangements. It has been much discussed 
during 2013, including from a competition perspective. 
Concerning antitrust enforcement in card payments, the Commission found in 2007 that 
MasterCard's Multilateral Interchange Fees (MIFs) for card payments were a restriction under 
Article 101(1) TFEU and that MasterCard had not demonstrated that the MIFs were justified 
on efficiency grounds under Article 101(3) TFEU. On 24 May 2012 the General Court fully 
upheld the Commission's 2007 decision. MasterCard appealed against that ruling and 
proceedings continued before the European Court of Justice in 2013. The Opinion of the 
Advocate-General was delivered on 30 January 2014.  
                                                            
129 Commission proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and the Council on payment services in the 
internal market and amending Directives 2002/65/EC, 2013/36/EE and 2009/110/EC and repealing Directive 
2007/64/EC, Brussels 24 July 2013, COM(2013) 547 final, available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0547:FIN:EN:PDF  
130 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on interchange fees for 
card-based payment transactions, COM/2013/0550 final – 2013/0265 (COD) of 24 July 2013, available at 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0550:FIN:EN:HTML 
131 Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Regulation 
(EU) No 260/2012 as regards the migration to Union-wide credit transfers and direct debits, Brussels, 9 January 
2014, COM(2013) 937 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/payments/docs/sepa/1401069_proposal_en.pdf  
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As for the on-going proceedings against VISA132, in May, Visa Europe offered commitments 
to the Commission concerning its MIFs for credit card payments and the limitations it 
imposed on cross-border acquiring; a market test was conducted during May and June. The 
investigation of the EPC's work on standardisation for e-payment systems was closed in 
June133, following the announcement by the EPC that it would stop its work on the e-
Payments Framework and following the withdrawal of the complaint by Sofort AG. The 
Commission, in close co-operation with national competition authorities, will continue to 
monitor that market closely. 
Antitrust and cartel investigations in the financial sector 
Since 2011, the Commission has been carrying out an investigation on the credit default 
swaps (“CDS”) market. As a result of that investigation, on 1 July, the Commission issued a 
Statement of Objections (“SO”), addressed to 13 investment banks, the International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) and the data service provider Markit.134 In the SO the 
Commission preliminarily concluded that between 2006 and 2009 the 13 investment banks, 
ISDA and Markit acted collectively to prevent two exchanges (Eurex in 2007 and CMDX in 
2008) from entering credit derivatives trading by collectively denying various inputs 
necessary to launch exchange trading. Compared to OTC trading, exchange trading is more 
efficient, less expensive and less prone to systemic risks. Therefore, if proven, such behaviour 
of the above named institutions could, according to the Commission, constitute a serious 
breach of competition law and be subject to sanctions. 
In 2013, the Commission has also taken a close look at the implementation of the 
commitment decisions it adopted in previous years in the financial data markets. As part of a 
reinforced policy of compliance monitoring, the Commission is monitoring the 
implementation of the commitments Standard and Poor's offered in 2011 under which it 
supplies the International Securities Identification Numbers (US ISINs) unbundled from 
additional data. Equally, the Commission started to monitor the compliance by Thomson 
Reuters with the commitments adopted by the Commission in 2012 to licence usage rights of 
the Reuters Instruments Codes (RICs) to its customers for the purpose of retrieving data 
provided by other competing financial data providers. 
The Commission also took steps in 2013 to acquire more in-depth knowledge of the markets 
where it granted certain exemptions from the application of general competition rules, such as 
risk sharing by insurers. The work preceding leading up to the most recent renewal of the 
Insurance Block Exemption Regulation (EU) No. 267/2010135 as well as the conclusions of 
the Business Insurance Sector inquiry published in 2007136 showed the need for the 
Commission to both collect empirical information on the functioning of the insurance markets 
                                                            
132 See Memo/13/431 of 14 May 2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-
431_en.htm?locale=en  
133 See Memo/13/553 of 13 June 2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-13-553_en.htm  
134 See IP/13/60 of 1 July 2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-630_en.htm  
135 See  IP/12/777 of 12 July 2012, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-777_en.htm 
136 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on Sector Inquiry under Article 17 of Regulation (EC) 
No 1/2003 on business insurance (Final Report), Brussels, 25 September 2007, COM(2007) 556 final, available 
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2007:0556:FIN:EN:PDF 
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and to carry out a continuous monitoring of the BER application. For that purpose, in 
February the Commission published a study on co(re)insurance pools and on ad-hoc 
co(re)insurance agreements prepared by Ernst & Young.137 That study presents an overview 
of the functioning of subscription markets across the European Union, as part of the 
preparation for the review of the Insurance Block Exemption Regulation (EU) No. 267/2010, 
which will expire on 31 March 2017. The results of the study were presented to and discussed 
with market participants and stakeholders in a workshop organized by the Commission in 
March 2013. 
 
Restoring confidence in the financial sector – elimination of the financial derivatives cartels 
On 4 December, the Commission fined 8 banks a total of EUR 1,7 billion for participating in cartels in markets 
for financial derivatives covering the EEA. Four of them participated in a cartel relating to interest rate 
derivatives denominated in the euro currency. Six of them participated in one or more bilateral cartels relating to 
interest rate derivatives denominated in Japanese yen. These collusions are prohibited by Article 101 TFEU. As 
both decisions were adopted under the settlement procedure, fines were reduced by 10%.  
The Euro interest rate derivatives (EIRD) cartel operated between September 2005 and May 2008. The settling 
parties are Barclays, Deutsche Bank, RBS and Société Générale. The cartel aimed at distorting the normal 
course of pricing components for those derivatives. Traders of different banks discussed their bank's 
submissions for the calculation of the EURIBOR as well as their trading and pricing strategies.  
The investigation started with unannounced inspections in October 2011 while the opening of proceedings took 
place in March 2013. Barclays was exempted from the fine that otherwise would have been imposed on it as it 
benefited from immunity for revealing the cartel. Deutsche Bank, RBS and Société Générale received a 
reduction of fines for their cooperation.  
Proceedings were also opened against Crédit Agricole, HSBC and JPMorgan and the investigation in respect of 
those three companies will continue under the standard cartel procedure.  
In the Yen interest rate derivatives (YIRD) sector, the Commission uncovered 7 distinct bilateral infringements 
lasting between 1 and 10 months in the period from 2007 to 2010. The collusion included discussions between 
traders of the participating banks on certain JPY LIBOR submissions. The traders involved also exchanged, on 
occasions, commercially sensitive information relating either to trading positions or to future JPY LIBOR 
submissions (once also relating to certain future submissions for the Euroyen TIBOR – Tokyo interbank offered 
rate). The banks involved in one or more of the infringements are UBS, RBS, Deutsche Bank, Citigroup and 
JPMorgan. The broker RP Martin facilitated one of the infringements by using its contacts with a number of 
JPY LIBOR panel banks that did not participate in the infringement, with the aim of influencing their JPY 
LIBOR submissions.  
The Commission opened proceedings in February 2013. UBS received full immunity for revealing the 
infringements. Citigroup also benefited from full immunity for its participation in one bilateral infringement. 
For their cooperation, the Commission granted fine reductions to Citigroup, Deutsche Bank, RBS and RP 
Martin. 
In the context of the same investigation, the Commission has also opened proceedings against the cash broker 
ICAP. This investigation continues under the standard cartel procedure. 
Merger investigations in the financial sector 
In the area of merger control the Commission continued to ensure that concentrations in the 
financial services sector do not lead to market distortions. The Commission looked for 
                                                            
137 Ernst & Young, "Study on co(re)insurance pools and on ad-hoc co(re)insurance agreements on the 
subscription market" (February 2013), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/financial_services/insurance.html  
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example into the acquisition of NYSE Euronext by the InterContinental Exchange (both 
operating exchanges providing trading and clearing services, particularly in the field of 
derivatives) and found that the transaction would not raise competition concerns as the two 
parties are not direct competitors in the markets concerned and would continue to face 
competition from a number of other competitors. 
The same acquisition target, a different outcome 
The Commission investigated two proposed mergers involving NYSE Euronext in 2012 and 2013. The proposed 
merger between Deutsche Börse and NYSE Euronext (DB/NYSE) was prohibited in February 2012138 while the 
acquisition of NYSE Euronext by InterContinental Exchange (ICE/NYSE)139 was cleared in June 2013. 
In the 2012 case the merger would have created a monopoly, whereas in the 2013 case the merged entity would 
continue to face a number of other competitors. The DB/NYSE decision set a precedent for the analysis of the 
markets concerned. The ICE/NYSE Euronext deal was assessed in light of this precedent. However, every 
transaction is analysed on its own merits and the factual differences between the two cases explain the different 
outcomes. 
In both cases, the Commission’s assessment focused on the impact that each deal would have on the trading and 
clearing of derivatives. The core derivative business of both Deutsche Börse and NYSE Euronext – the 
companies involved in the 2012 transaction – were European financial derivatives. The Commission’s 
investigation showed that each exerted a strong competitive constraint on the other. Hence, the merger would 
have led to a near-monopoly in European financial derivatives worldwide which could not be remedied by the 
commitments submitted by the parties. Therefore, the Commission had no alternative than to block it. 
In contrast, the contracts offered by ICE and NYSE Euronext meet different trading needs. ICE's core derivatives 
businesses are in energy. Therefore, the ICE/NYSE transaction did not lead to a significant impediment of 
effective competition and it was authorised.  
Investing in derivative products is an important risk management tool for companies. Competitive pricing for 
derivative products helps keep the costs of companies down and contributes to their competitiveness.  
State aid investigations in the financial sector 
The special EU State aid crisis rules, first adopted in 2008 and 2009 and amended in 2010 and 
2011 were materially revamped in August 2013.140 Those rules are also largely in line with 
the Commission’s proposal for a directive on Banking Recovery and Resolution141. They also 
allow State aid control to continue to ensure a consistent policy response to the financial crisis 
throughout the EU and played an important role in limiting distortions of competition in the 
internal market.  
                                                            
138 Case M.6166 Deutsche Börse / NYSE Euronext, decision of 1 February 2012. 
139 Case M.6873 Intercontinental Exchange / NYSE Euronext, decision of 24 June 2013. 
140 Communication from the Commission of 30 July 2013 on the application, from 1 August 2013, of State aid 
rules to support measures in favour of banks in the context of the financial crisis ("Banking Communication", OJ 
C 216, P. 1-15, available at  
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2013:216:0001:01:EN:HTML.  
141 Commission Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council establishing a 
framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and investment firms and amending Council 
Directives 77/91/EEC and 82/891/EC, Directives 2001/24/EC, 2002/47/EC, 2004/25/EC, 2005/56/EC, Brussels, 
COM(2012) 280/3, available at  
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/crisis-management/2012_eu_framework/COM_2012_280_en.pdf  
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Over the past five years, the Commission has analysed the restructuring of 68 banks – 
equivalent to around one quarter of Europe’s banking sector in terms of assets. Of those 
banks, 23 were resolved. Today, 27 cases are still pending. 
Between 1 October 2008 and 1 October 2013 the Commission took more than 400 decisions 
authorising State aid measures to the financial sector. However, only part of this aid was 
actually used. In particular, only around one-third of the guarantees approved by the 
Commission have been provided by Member States eventually. 
In the period 2008-2012, the overall volume of aid used for capital support (recapitalization 
and asset relief measures) amounted to EUR 591.9 billion (4.6 % of EU 2012 GDP). The 
guarantees and other form of liquidity supports reached its peak in 2009 with an outstanding 
amount of EUR 906 billion (7.7 % of EU 2012 GDP). The crisis intensity has gradually 
weakened in many EU countries since then, and the outstanding amount of liquidity support 
has dropped to EUR 534.5 billion (4.14 % of EU 2012 GDP) in 2012. 
The bulk of the support provided by Member States to their respective banking systems was 
precisely in the form of guarantee measures. In 2012, EUR 492 billion of State guarantees 
were still outstanding compared to the peak of EUR 835.8 billion (7.1 % of EU 2012 GDP). 
Less than 0.2% – that is, EUR 2 billion – of the total guarantees provided by the Member 
States has actually been called to date. 
In addition to guarantees on liabilities, some Member States have been providing a direct 
short term liquidity support to banks and other troubled financial institutions. The 
outstanding liquidity measures reached their peak of  EUR 70.1 billion (0.6 % of EU 2012 
GDP) in 2009.The EU 27 outstanding amount in 2012 dropped down to EUR 42.2 billion 
(0.33 % of EU 2012 GDP). 
As regards recapitalisation measures, over the same period Member States recapitalised their 
respective banks for EUR 413.2 billion (or 3.2% of EU GDP in 2012). The four countries 
that most supported their banks with capital measures during these years were the UK (EUR 
82 billion), Germany (EUR 64 billion), Ireland (EUR 63 billion), and Spain (EUR 60 billion). 
The top receiving banks were RBS (EUR 46 billion), Anglo Irish Bank (EUR 32 billion), and 
Bankia (EUR 22 billion). 
For the period 2008-2012 Member States provided asset relief measures for a total of EUR 
178.7 billion (1.4 % of EU 2012 GDP). 
However, it is important to point out that State aid rules ensure that Member States are 
remunerated for their aid. For the massive guarantees provided during the past four years, 
Member States have received EUR 33 billion in guarantee fees (against EUR 2 billion of 
guarantees invoked). As of end 2012, Member States have received a total of EUR 125 
billion in revenue in exchange for their support to the banks. 
The new rules introduce three main changes: 
• First, they establish the principle that before resorting to taxpayers' money, banks should bear the cost 
of their restructuring by going to the market, using internal resources, and asking for the contribution of 
shareholders, hybrids holders, and junior debt creditors. Moreover, junior creditors will be treated in the same 
way across the EU. Apart from strengthening the level playing field, it sends a clear message that depositors are 
protected. The new rules make sure that banks from stronger EU countries do not benefit from an implicit 
guarantee and thus enjoy cheaper funding costs. 
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• Second, no State aid in the form of recapitalisation or impaired-asset relief will in principle be approved 
before the burden sharing takes place and the restructuring plan is approved by the Commission. In the past, 
banks were rescued quickly, but the restructuring and stabilization process often took a long time. Under the new 
system, the Commission will in principle adopt final restructuring decisions before any irreversible public funds 
are disbursed. 
• Third, a cap on executive remuneration for all aided banks aims at setting the right incentives for the 
management to implement the agreed restructuring plans and have their organisations refund the money received 
from the public coffers as soon as possible. 
In 2013, the Commission adopted a considerable number of decisions on individual banks. 
For example, in the case of Banca Monte dei Paschi di Siena ("MPS")142, the Italian 
government provided EUR 2 billion to cover a capital shortfall coming from the December 
2011 EBA stress test. After Italy ensured that the bank's business model is less risky the 
Commission approved MPS' restructuring plan on 27 November. 
In the case of Hypo Alpe Adria Group (HGAA) 143 the Commission approved in August a plan 
to sell the operative parts of the bank in Austria and South-Eastern Europe by mid-2015, at 
the latest. The bank’s non-viable remainder is put into an orderly wind-down process. Until 
the sales process is complete, Austria commits to a number of restrictions for new business. 
Restrictions include risk control, thus ensuring that the marketability of the subsidiaries is 
enhanced and that competition distortions are kept to a minimum. 
The Commission also monitored the implementation of a large number of restructuring 
decision. It demonstrated its commitment to that task in a number of amendment decisions. 
For example, in case of German Landesbank HSH144, the Commission reopened an approved 
restructuring case from spring 2012 after the owners of the bank, two German Länder had 
granted an additional State guarantee to the bank. The bank has now to prove afresh that it can 
restore its viability. 
The specific situation of Programme Countries 
As part of the Troika, the Commission continued in 2013 to collaborate with the IMF and the 
ECB on the financial sector programmes in the Programme Countries. The Commission aims 
to ensure that the massive public support provided to the banks in the difficult macro-
economic environment does not result in undue distortions of competition. 
The State recapitalisation of the Greek banking sector was completed in summer 2013. Three 
of the pillar banks (Piraeus Bank, Alpha Bank and National Bank of Greece - NBG) were 
successful in raising at least 10% of the required capital increase by private means. Eurobank 
was fully recapitalised by the Hellenic Financial Stability Fund (HFSF). Moreover, the 
consolidation of the Greek banking sector, which started in 2012, continued in 2013 and has 
almost been finalised. Two smaller banks, Probank and First Business Bank (FBB) were 
resolved and sold to NBG. Separately, Eurobank acquired the bridge banks New Hellenic 
                                                            
142 Case SA.36175 MPS – Restructuring, decision of 27 November 2013 
143 Case SA.32554 Restructuring aid for Hypo Group Alpe Adria of 3 September 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_32554  
144 Case SA.29338 € - $ - Increase of the ceiling amount of a second-loss guarantee for HSH Nordbank AG, 
decision of 21 June 2013 
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Postbank and New Proton Bank. Following those developments, in the second half of 2013 
the Commission services engaged with the Greek authorities and the banks on the discussions 
on their restructuring plans, which aim at ensuring that the banks improve their efficiency and 
focus their resources on their Greek banking operations, in line with State aid rules. 
In Ireland, the Commission approved amendments to Bank of Ireland´s second restructuring 
plan and continues to monitor the implementation of its commitments. The analysis of the 
restructuring plan of Allied Irish Banks progressed, and an updated restructuring plan was 
presented by permanent tsb bank in the summer. The plans for both banks were under 
assessment also taking into account the Asset Quality Review carried out by the Central Bank 
of Ireland towards the end of the year. The Irish credit union sector still has to undergo 
restructuring and consolidation to ensure the viability of that fragmented sector. 
In 2011 the EU and the IMF agreed to a EUR 78 billion support package for Portugal. In 
order to strengthen confidence in the financial sector, the programme requires banks to 
achieve high levels of capital which for the most part was completed in 2012. In 2013, the 
restructuring plans of Caixa Geral de Depósitos145, Millennium BCP146, Banco Português de 
Investimento147 were approved by the Commission. Discussions continue with a fourth bank, 
Banco Internacional do Funchal. 
In Spain, 2013 was the first full year of the implementation of the various restructuring plans 
approved for banks that received State aid in the context of the eighteen-month financial 
assistance programme which was granted in July 2012. Individual monitoring trustees 
reported regularly on the implementation of those plans. During the first half of 2013, the so-
called subordinated liability exercises (“SLE”), for the banks that received State aid were 
completed, generating almost EUR 13 billion of capital in these banks and reducing the need 
for additional public funds. Finally, the restructuring of aided banks under the control of the 
State made significant progress with the sale of NCG Banco in December. 
As regard Cyprus, the two largest domestic banks, Bank of Cyprus and LAIKI (Cyprus 
Popular Bank), have been resolved and the latter merged into the former. Both subordinated 
debt bond holders and uninsured depositors were bailed-in to recapitalise the banks, such that 
no State recapitalisation aid was necessary. Out of the EUR 10 bn programme assistance, 
EUR 1.5 billion was earmarked for the Cooperative Credit Institutions. The restructuring of 
the group was negotiated throughout 2013. 
 4. BASIC INDUSTRIES AND MANUFACTURING 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
The EU and the Member States shall, in accordance with Article 173 TFEU, ensure that the 
conditions necessary for the competitiveness of the Union's industry exist. For that purpose, in 
                                                            
145  Case SA.35062 Restructuring of CGD, decision of 24 July 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_35062  
146  Case SA.34724 Restructuring of Banco Comercial Português (BCP) Group, decision of 30 August 2013, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result  
147 Case SA.35238 BPI Restructuring, decision of 24 July 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_35238  
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accordance with a system of open and competitive markets, their actions shall be aimed at, 
among other things, speeding up the adjustment of industry to structural changes as well as 
fostering better exploitation of the industrial potential of policies of innovation, research and 
technological development. Competition policy continues to play a key role in that context. 
For decades, the share of industrial production in EU GDP has been declining but its 
importance far outweighs its share in GDP. Industry is the leading contributor to productivity 
and to research and innovation, where industry’s share is four times higher than its GDP 
share. Industry also accounts for 80% of EU exports that is the main driver of the recovery 
that has started in 2013. The Commission’s 2013 Competitiveness Report148 found that the 
share of manufacturing has reached a critical threshold, below which the sustainability of the 
European economic and social model might be at risk. Industrial policy measures have to 
build on strengths and address weaknesses to support the reinforcement of the 
competitiveness of EU manufacturing. Competition policy underpins and reinforces the 
effects of industrial policy measures. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Competition policy continued to be applied in 2013 in line with industrial policy priorities. In 
particular, enforcement action in antitrust and cartels in basic industries helps to keep the 
prices of essential input material affordable. 
Antitrust investigations in basic industries 
In the markets for aluminium smelting technology and related equipment the Commission 
concluded its investigation in the Rio Tinto Alcan case. The Commission was concerned that 
Rio Tinto Alcan's practice of contractually tying the licensing of its leading smelting 
technology to the purchase of handling equipment from one of its subsidiaries could infringe 
EU competition rules and lead to higher prices, hamper innovation and foreclose competitors. 
In order to address these concerns, Rio Tinto Alcan committed to enable future licensees of its 
technology to purchase specialty cranes from any recommended supplier. The latter will be 
selected following an objective and non-discriminatory process, with Rio Tinto Alcan 
providing competing suppliers with the necessary technical specifications to ensure that their 
cranes are capable of operating in smelters using Rio Tinto Alcan's technologies. In December 
2012, the Commission adopted a decision rending legally binding Rio Tinto Alcan's 
commitments.149 These commitments will open up the market for equipment used in 
aluminium smelters, increasing customers' choice.  
Cartel enforcement investigations into car parts provide a good example of the strength of the 
immunity/leniency system. The system destabilises cartels through the potential domino effect 
of individual cases. After an investigation begins, companies that recognise they may have 
been involved in cartel activity frequently conduct internal audits. Were such audits to 
uncover other cartels, this may lead to further immunity applications often involving cartels 
that are otherwise stable. For instance following the wire harness inspection in February 2010, 
                                                            
148 See Commission Staff Working Document: 'European Competitiveness Report 2013 – Towards a knowledge-
driven reindustrialisation', SWD(2013)347 final, available at http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/industrial-
competitiveness/competitiveness-analysis/european-competitiveness-report/files/eu-2013-eur-comp-rep_en.pdf 
149 Case AT.39230 Rio Tinto Alcan, decision of 20 December 2013 
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the Commission confirmed inspections in the occupant safety systems, bearings, lighting and 
thermal systems in 2011 and 2012. 
 
The first domino in the car parts sector  
In July, the Commission adopted a decision in respect of automotive wire harnesses. The decision 
fined the car parts suppliers Sumitomo, Yazaki, Furukawa, S-Y Systems Technologies (SYS) and 
Leoni a total of EUR  141 791 000 for taking part in one or more of five cartels for the supply of wire 
harnesses to Toyota, Honda, Nissan and Renault. Wire harnesses represent an assembly of cables 
transmitting signals or electric power linking computers to various components built in a car. They are 
often described as the 'central nervous system' of the car. The cartels covered the whole European 
Economic Area (EEA). 
The companies coordinated the prices and allocation of supplies of wire harnesses to the respective car 
manufacturers. The cartel contacts took place both in Japan and in the EEA: 
The coming months and years are likely to lead to further decisions, bringing to an 
end an extensive network of anti-competitive practices in the car parts sector. 
Merger investigations in basic industries 
Through the merger control regulation, the Commission continued to safeguard consumers' 
interests in this vital sector for productivity, research, and innovation by making its approval 
of a number of proposed concentrations subject to commitments. In case GE/Avio150, for 
example, the Commission's clearance decision was conditional upon the implementation of a 
series of measures designed to protect the important Eurojet military programme. In two cases 
in the paper industry, Munksjö/Ahlstrom151 and Kinnevik/Billerud/Korsnäs152 the divestiture 
of production lines was required to address the Commission's initial concerns. Divestitures 
were also necessary in two other cases that brought together two important players in their 
respective sectors, namely case Crane Co/MEI Group (unattended payments systems)153 and 
Norsk Hydro/Orkla/JV (aluminium extrusions)154. 
In the oil refinery and specialty oil products sector the Commission unconditionally cleared 
the acquisition of Shell's Harburg refinery by the naphthenic specialty oils producer, Nynas.155 
Although Nynas will remain the only naphthenic producer in the EEA, the acquisition was the 
only way to save the Harburg production plant from closure. Therefore, the transaction 
enables a higher production capacity and lower prices for naphthenic specialty products in 
Europe to be maintained. 
                                                            
150 Case M.6844 GE / AVIO, decision of 1 July 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result 
151 Case M.6576 Munksjô / Ahlstrom, decision of 4 May 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result 
152 Case M.6682 Kinnevik/Billerud/Korsnäs, decision of 27 November 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result 
153 Case M.6857 Crane Co/MEI Group, decision of 19 July 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result 
154 Case M.6756 Norsk Hydro/Orkla/JV, decision of 13 May 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_6756 
155 Case M.6360 Nynas/Shell/Harburg Refinery, decision of 2 September 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_6360 
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State aid investigations in basic industries 
In the manufacturing sector, the most notable State aid case in 2013 concerned the rescue and 
restructuring of the PSA Peugeot Citroën group156. Following an in-depth investigation, the 
Commission concluded that restructuring aid of EUR 571.9 million granted by France to the 
PSA group is compatible with the internal market. The aid took form of a State guarantee 
covering bond issues by the Banque PSA Finance until 31 December 2016 up to a maximum 
of EUR 7 billion for the principal (a gross subsidy-equivalent of EUR 486 million) on the one 
hand, and a repayable advance of EUR 85.9 million for the implementation of the 
‘50CO2Cars’ R&D project on the other. 
The updating of the group’s restructuring plan based on recent trends on the vehicle market in 
Europe eased the Commission’s initial concerns regarding the group’s return to viability. 
Should the group’s results be considerably below those envisaged by the plan, the group has 
undertaken to take additional corrective action so as not to exceed a certain level of net debt 
during the restructuring period. The group’s return to viability will also help the situation of 
the Bank, whose present difficulties are due to its organic links with the rest of the group. The 
Commission also considered that the ‘50CO2Cars’ R&D project to develop a ‘mild-hybrid’ 
diesel engine, which is part of the restructuring plan, will make a positive contribution to the 
viability of the group. In addition, France gave a number of commitments in relation to the 
price of the guarantee and the margin for loans granted by Banque PSA Finance to minimise 
the competition distortions created by the aid.  
 5. THE AGRI-FOOD INDUSTRY 
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
New landscape for competition policy following CAP reform 
The recently adopted reform of the Common Agricultural Policy significantly modified the 
framework for the application of competition rules in this sector, as new exemptions from the 
application of competition rules have been introduced. Article 42 TFEU provides that the 
competition rules apply to the production and trade of agricultural products only to the extent 
determined by the Council and (with the Lisbon Treaty) the Parliament, "account being taken 
of the objectives" set out in Article 39 TFEU.  
Throughout the reform process, the EU competition authorities have strongly advocated for 
the enforcement of competition rules as this helps to ensure a productive, strong and effective 
agricultural sector. In that respect, the Heads of the European Competition Authorities 
adopted a resolution on 21 December 2012157. Ultimately, both legislators agreed with the 
Commission and the National Competition Authorities that the newly introduced exemptions 
from the application of competition rules should be accompanied by requirements to ensure 
not only the consolidation of farmers' position in the value chain but also the restructuring of 
the sector and increased efficiencies in farmers' activities.   
                                                            
156 Case SA.35611 Aide à la restructuration du groupe PSA, decision of 2 May 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/index.cfm?fuseaction=dsp_result 
157 Resolution of the Meeting of the Heads of the European Competition Authorities of 21 December 2012, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/agriculture/documents_en.html  
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The food supply chain connects three important sectors of the European economy: (1) 
agricultural production: (2) food processing and (3) distribution (wholesale and retail). Unlike 
the last two levels of the supply chain, the agricultural production level is highly atomised and 
dispersed: farmers are organised in small structures and do not achieve economies of scale in 
procurement, storage or selling while they are (often) facing large buyers. The question of the 
farmer's position in the value chain and particularly their lack of bargaining power vis-à-vis 
their buyers was at the heart of the recent reform of the Common Agricultural Policy 
("CAP"). 
Result of the CAP reform: 
In the framework of the CAP reform, the European Parliament and the Council in their role as co-legislators 
decided to introduce an exemption from the application of competition rules in the new Common Market 
Organisation Regulation ("CMO"). The exemption benefits producers in the sectors for olive oil, beef and certain 
arable crops who are members of Producer Organisations (POs) and would like to engage in joint selling 
(including joint price negotiation) for part or all of their production through such POs.  
This exemption is however subject to certain conditions. The volume of production covered by such negotiations 
should not exceed certain thresholds so as to avoid creating excessive market power. Furthermore, benefiting 
farmers also need to engage in joint activities other than joint-selling within the POs concerned so that activities 
of the POs overall contribute to the achievement of the CAP objectives.  
This second condition is designed to encourage farmers to take concrete steps to increase their economies of 
scale and scope. They can do so by, for instance, pooling together at the appropriate scales their input 
procurement, investments in storage facilities, or distribution systems. This would enable them to improve their 
bargaining power and at the same time reduce their overall production and supply costs, thus enhancing their 
competitiveness.  
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Retail distribution is characterised by an increased concentration of retailers, the existence of 
buying alliances and the rising success of private label products. These phenomena raise 
concerns about the unbalanced bargaining power of retailers in their commercial relationships 
with their suppliers. They also lead to a perceived existence of unfair trading practices within 
the framework of such relations. The European Parliament has called for the Commission to 
investigate the functioning of competition in the supply chain and in particular at the retail 
level of the chain158. In addition, members of the High Level Forum159 and some operators in 
the food chain complained that unfair trading practices have negatively affected choice and 
innovation in the agri-food industry. National Competition Authorities have also found in 
their monitoring reports that "unfair commercial practices" might have a potential negative 
impact on choice and innovation in the long run.160 On the basis of a Green Paper and a public 
consultation on unfair trading practices in the B2B food and non-food supply chain, the 
                                                            
158 European Parliament resolution of 19 January 2012 on the imbalances in the food supply chain, available at 
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?type=TA&reference=P7-TA-2012-
0012&language=EN&ring=B7-2012-0013  
159 The High Level Forum for a Better Functioning Food Supply Chain, was set by the Commission to 
implement a roadmap of initiatives to improve the competitiveness of the agro-food industry in cooperation with 
the stakeholders. See: Commission Decision 2010/C 210/03 of 30 July 2010, amended by Commission Decision 
2012/C 396/06 of 19 December 2012 
160 ECN Activities in the Food Sector" – Report on competition law enforcement and market monitoring 
activities by European competition authorities in the food sector, May 2012, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/ecn/food_report_en.pdf  
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Commission is assessing whether action at EU level is required in this context. The analysis is 
now in its final stages. The Commission also launched a study in December 2012 managed by 
the Food Task Force161, to assess the economic impact of modern retail supply chains on 
choice and innovation in the EU food sector ("retail study")162. 
The study will measure how choice and innovation in food products has evolved and identify 
the drivers of such evolution. In particular, it will aim to identify the impact of concentration 
in retail and manufacturing on choice and innovation in the food supply chain. That study will 
thus be able to answer the request of the European Parliament to analyse competition in the 
supply chain and will contribute economic evidence on investment in the chain to the 
discussion on unfair trading practices within the food supply chain. The final report of the 
study is expected by early 2014. 
Antitrust and cartel investigations in the sector 
In November, the Commission fined four European North Sea shrimps traders a total of EUR 
28,7 million for operating a cartel in breach of EU antitrust rules163. The companies included 
Heiploeg, Klaas Puul, Kok Seafood (all of the Netherlands) and Stührk (of Germany). 
Between June 2000 and January 2009 Heiploeg and Klaas Puul agreed to fix prices and share 
sales volumes of North Sea shrimps in Belgium, France, Germany and the Netherlands. Kok 
Seafood participated at least from February 2005 and Stührk was involved in price fixing in 
Germany in the period from March 2003 to November 2007. Klaas Puul received full 
immunity from fines under the Commission's 2006 Leniency Notice, as it was the first to 
provide information and evidence about the cartel which enabled the Commission to find an 
infringement.  
The purpose of the cartel was to freeze the market by stabilising the suppliers' market shares 
in order to facilitate price increases and stimulate profitability. The cartel affected the EU 
market and sales in Belgium, Germany, France and the Netherlands in particular.  
The cartel took the form of a range of informal bilateral contacts primarily between Heiploeg 
and Klaas Puul but also involving Stührk and Kok Seafood. The discussions usually covered 
a wide range of aspects of their business, including their purchase prices from fishermen, 
conduct towards other traders on the market, market sharing, and prices charged to specific 
important customers that often set the benchmark price for other customers. 
Merger investigations in the sector 
Merger control in the agri-food business has an important role in protecting the choice and the 
quality of the food that European consumers enjoy today. In 2013, the Commission examined 
a number of merger transactions concerning the production of agricultural or fisheries 
products.  
                                                            
161 On 1 January 2012 DG COMP set up a Food Task Force to better focus on the developments in the agri-food 
sector 
162 Study on "The economic impact of modern retail on choice and innovation in the EU food sector", 
COMP/2012/015, OJ/S S244 of 19 December 2012 
163 Case Comp 39633, Shrimps, decision of 27 November 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39633  
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Whilst the Commission found that some transactions involving cooperatives in the dairy 
sector did not raise concerns (e.g. Arla Foods/Milch Union Hocheifel164) in others (e.g. Arla 
Foods/Milk Link165 or Friesland Campina/ Zijerveld&Veldhuyzen and Den Hollander166) it 
found that the combination of certain activities of the merging parties would significantly 
reduce competition and therefore approved the transactions subject to modifications. In Arla 
Foods/Milk Link the parties committed to divest Milk Link's long-life milk and dairy drinks 
business, including the transfer of brands and the production facilities while in Friesland 
Campina/ Zijerveld&Veldhuyzen and Den Hollander the parties committed to modify semi-
hard goat cheese production and supply arrangements and to make goat milk available to 
competitors.  
Those cases demonstrate that consumers have preferences for dairy products produced from 
domestic milk. That market characteristic substantially limits the scope for competition by 
imports for some dairy products (e.g. long-life milk in the UK, semi-hard goat cheese in the 
Netherlands). These cases also show that the Commission allows the growth of farmers' 
cooperatives including across borders but carefully ensures that they do not significantly 
reduce competition where there is already concentration. 
The Commission also approved three other cases in the food and drink sector subject to 
commitments. In Marine Harvest/Morpol167, the parties committed to divest a significant 
proportion of their salmon farming activities in Scotland. In Refresco Group/Pride Foods168, 
which concerned the manufacturing and bottling of non-carbonated soft drinks, the parties 
committed to sell a bottling plant in Germany. In McCain Foods Group/Lutosa Business169 
the parties committed to divest the retail business operated under the "Lutosa" brand in the 
EEA to a suitable purchaser. 
 6. THE PHARMACEUTICAL AND HEALTH SERVICES SECTOR  
Overview of key challenges in the sector  
The pharmaceutical and health care sectors are both fragmented by national regulations 
regarding authorisation, pricing and reimbursement status of the goods or services concerned. 
That fragmentation of the Single Market can give rise to artificial barriers to entry. EU 
competition policy has a key role to play in contributing to competitive outcomes, cost-
containment and innovation in that important area. 
The pharmaceutical sector is highly regulated and R&D driven. On the supply side, originator 
companies aim to bring innovative products to the market. The patent system provides the 
                                                            
164 Case M.6627 Arla Foods/Milch Union Hocheifel, decision of 28 September 2012, IP/12/1039 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1039_en.htm 
165 Case M.6611 Arla Foods/Milk Link, decision of 27 September 2012, IP/12/1038 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-1038_en.htm 
166 Case M.6722 Friesland Campina/ Zijerveld&Veldhuyzen and Den Hollander, decision of 12 April 2013, see 
IP/13/319 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-319_en.htm 
167 Case M.6850 Marine Harvest/Morpol, decision of 30 September 2013, see IP/13/896 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-896_en.htm 
168 Case M.6924 Refresco Group/Pride Foods, decision of 4 October 2013, see IP/13/913 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-913_en.htm 
169 Case M.6813 McCain Foods Group/Lutosa Business, decision of 28 May 2013, see IP/13/470 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-470_en.htm 
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legislative framework allowing the companies to reap the benefits of their successful R&D 
activities. During patent protection, competition mainly takes place on innovation between 
originator companies. Upon the expiry of the patent, generic companies typically enter the 
market with much lower price bio-equivalent versions of the originator products. Generic 
entry on patent expiry entails savings for public budgets. The threat of generic entry also 
incentivises originator companies to pursue their R&D efforts to develop new and innovative 
proprietary medicines. Thus, at the point of loss of patent protection, competition on price is 
added to competition on innovation between originator and generic companies or between 
generic companies. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
The Commission's Sector inquiry Report170 published in 2009 highlighted a series of concerns 
in the European pharmaceutical sector. As a follow-up, the Commission's enforcement 
focused on agreements concluded between originator and generic companies, in particular 
pay-for-delay deals between competitors. Those agreements typically feature payments made 
by the originator to the generic company preparing its entry on the market in competition with 
the former. Instead of competing, however, the companies agree to delay generic entry to the 
detriment of consumers. In 2013, the Commission's enforcement action featured two pay-for-
delay cases, Lundbeck and Fentanyl. In the Lundbeck case171 a prohibition decision was 
adopted on 19 June. In the Fentanyl case172, further to a Statement of Objections in January, a 
prohibition decision was adopted on 10 December. 
Antitrust enforcement actions in 2013: 
The Lundbeck case concerns agreements concluded in 2002 and 2003 between the Danish pharmaceutical 
company Lundbeck and a number of generic companies (Alpharma (now part of Pfizer), Merck KGaA/Generics 
UK (Generics UK is now part of Mylan), Arrow (now part of Actavis), and Ranbaxy). These agreements were 
concluded at a time when the compound patent for citalopram, an antidepressant and Lundbeck's then best-
selling medicine, had expired. Lundbeck held a number of related process patents which provided a more limited 
protection than a compound patent. Producers of cheaper, generic versions of citalopram therefore had the 
possibility of entering the market. Indeed, several generic producers were preparing to enter the market and one 
of them had actually started selling its generic product elsewhere in the EEA. Instead of pursuing their efforts to 
enter the market, the generic companies agreed not to do so, in return for substantial payments from Lundbeck. 
Lundbeck paid significant lump sums, purchased generics' stock for the sole purpose of destroying it, and offered 
guaranteed profits in a distribution agreement. In exchange, Lundbeck obtained limitations on the generics' entry 
also going beyond what it could have obtained through enforcement of its process patents. The commitment by 
Lundbeck to refrain from infringement proceedings against the generic producers when they enter the market 
with generic citalopram after the expiry of the agreements was also part of the agreement. The Commission 
imposed a fine of EUR 93,8 million on Lundbeck and fines totalling EUR 52,2 million on the generic companies 
for violation of Article 101 TFEU. Currently, the Lundbeck decision is under appeal before the General Court. 
The Fentanyl case concerns an agreement between Janssen-Cilag, the Dutch subsidiary of Johnson & Johnson, 
and its generic competitor, Sandoz, the Dutch subsidiary of Novartis, which delayed the entry of cheaper generic 
fentanyl on the Dutch market. Fentanyl is a pain-killer one hundred times more potent than morphine. In 2005, 
Sandoz was on the verge of launching its generic version of the product in the Netherlands. However, the parties 
                                                            
170 For further information see Commission communication of 8 July 2009, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/sectors/pharmaceuticals/inquiry/ 
171 Case AT.39226 Lundbeck, decision of 19 June 2013, see press release IP/13/563 of 19 June 2013 available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39226  
172 Case AT.39685 Fentanyl, decision of 10 December 2013, see press release of 10 December 2013 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1233_en.htm 
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concluded a so-called "co-promotion agreement" according to which Sandoz received monthly payments from 
Johnson & Johnson for as long as there was no generic entry. The agreement lasted from July 2005 to December 
2006 and delayed the entry of a cheaper generic medicine for seventeen months, keeping prices for fentanyl in 
the Netherlands artificially high. Moreover, Janssen-Cilag did not consider any other existing potential partners 
for the "co-promotion agreement" but just focused on its close competitor Sandoz. Sandoz engaged in very 
limited or no actual co-promotion activities. The Commission imposed fines of EUR 10.8 million on Johnson & 
Johnson and EUR 5.5 million on Novartis for violation of Article 101 TFEU. 
The Office of Fair Trading in the United Kingdom issued a Statement of Objections in the 
Paroxetine pay-for-delay case in April 2013173. 
Merger investigations in the sector 
In the health sector increasing attention is paid to research and health service budgets. The 
Commission remained vigilant to the possible effects that the continued consolidation in the 
sector may have on competition. In a case concerning kidney dialysis174, the Commission's 
approval was made conditional on the divestment of Baxter's global continuous renal 
replacement therapy business thereby ensuring the emergence of a credible new player on the 
market.  
In the neighbouring life science sector the Commission authorised the acquisition of Life 
Technologies Corp. by rival Thermo Fisher Scientific Inc.175, both US-based companies 
active in life science markets. Their activities overlap in the supply of laboratory instruments 
and consumables. The clearance was made conditional on divestments of businesses 
producing and supplying (i) media and sera for cell culture, (ii) gene silencing products and 
(iii) polymer-based magnetic beads. In those areas, the merger, as initially notified, would 
have significantly reduced competition.  
That case is an example of international cooperation between competition authorities 
functioning well. Given the worldwide scope of the parties' activities, the Commission 
cooperated closely with the competition authorities of a significant number of countries 
outside the EU during the investigation. It involved a mutual exchange of views and evidence 
with the Federal Trade Commission in the US and with the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Commission. The Commission also cooperated with the Ministry of Commerce of 
China, the Japan Fair Trade Commission, the Competition Bureau of Canada and the 
Commerce Commission of New Zealand. 
 7. TRANSPORT AND POSTAL SERVICES 
Overview of key challenges in the sector 
Industrial consolidation in transport and the competitiveness of European industry 
                                                            
173 See press release of 19 April 2013, available at http://www.oft.gov.uk/news-and-updates/press/2013/36-
13#.Uqiob6uQzQM 
174 Case M.6851 Baxter International/ Gambro, decision of 22 July 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/cases/decisions/m6851_20130722_20212_3384737_EN.pdf  
175 Case M.6944 Thermo Fisher Scientific/Life Technologies, decision of 26 November 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_6944  
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The transport sector makes an important contribution to the competitiveness of European 
industry. If competition in transport is weak and prices are needlessly high, the international 
competitiveness of all of European industry will suffer. Transport and storage account for no 
less than 10-15% of the cost of a finished product. The Commission therefore closely tracks 
developments in the sector and intervenes where necessary. 
Transport services are very sensitive to overall economic developments. The improvement in 
business sentiment and the increase in consumer confidence observed in 2013 have 
contributed to a gradual increase in GDP growth rates in the second half of the year. 
Consequently, growth perspectives in the transport sector have improved as well, providing 
new opportunities for investment and industrial restructuring. 
As a result of the economic crisis, the industrial structure of the transport sector has been 
weakened. Overcapacity in air and maritime transport, in particular, has increased the pressure 
on companies to find ways to cut costs and raise additional revenues. In 2013, this has been 
reflected in a number of merger notifications, agreements between companies requiring a 
further investigation by competition authorities and requests for State support. While the 
Commission recognises that a further consolidation of supply in the sector may be necessary, 
such consolidation should not result in higher prices for customers and be detrimental to the 
competitiveness of European industry. 
Contribution of EU competition policy to tackling the challenges 
Potential anticompetitive effects resulting from increased concentration in the air transport 
sector 
The recent trends in the transformation of the air transport sector continued in 2013. The 
decrease in air traffic linked to the economic and financial crisis still has a strong effect on the 
position of airports and airlines alike. Many regional airports in Europe continue to make 
losses and only survive thanks to the subsidies they receive from local authorities. The large 
European hub airports, on the other hand, remain congested. The long-term outlook indicates 
that the air transport will continue to grow and that more and more airports will become 
congested, at least during peak hours. Airlines as well, were strongly hit by the crisis. As a 
result some of the smaller and less efficient airlines have gone out of business, been 
restructured or merged into larger entities. At the same time the strongest airlines consolidated 
their position as market leaders. Most of the remaining European airlines have decided to join 
one of the three big alliances - Star, SkyTeam and oneworld - as national restrictions on 
ownership and control prevent cross-border consolidation through airline mergers.  
The main competition concerns relate to the concentration of supply on certain routes 
resulting from airline mergers within the EU and the possible anticompetitive impact of 
different forms of collaboration within alliances, which range from bilateral codeshare176 
agreements to full-fledged joint ventures.  
An increase in air fares is particularly likely if the merging parties are close competitors based 
at the same airport, such as Ryanair and Aer Lingus at Dublin airport or Aegean Airlines and 
                                                            
176 Agreement between two or more airlines to list certain flights in a reservation system under each other´s 
names 
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Olympic Air at Athens airport. In February, the Commission therefore prohibited Ryanair’s 
third attempt to take over Aer Lingus177. The acquisition would have combined the two 
leading airlines operating from Ireland. The Commission concluded that the merger would 
have harmed consumers by creating a monopoly or a dominant position on 46 routes where, 
currently, Aer Lingus and Ryanair compete vigorously against each other. The remedies 
proposed by Ryanair during the course of the investigation fell short of addressing the 
competition concerns raised by the Commission. Ryanair appealed the Commission's decision 
at the General Court.178 
However, when in October the Commission had to rule a second time on the proposed 
Aegean/Olympic merger, it decided to unconditionally approve the proposed transaction.179 
The reason for that decision was that the Commission's in-depth investigation had shown that 
Olympic Air would have been forced to exit the market in the near future due to financial 
difficulties if not acquired by Aegean. Once Olympic went out of business, Aegean would 
become the only significant domestic service provider in Greece and would capture Olympic's 
current market shares. Therefore, with or without the merger, Olympic would have soon 
disappeared as a competitor to Aegean. The Commission therefore concluded that the merger 
caused no harm to competition that would not have occurred anyway.  
The Commission was also called upon to rule on the merger of US Airways and American 
Airlines180. The transaction would lead in particular to a monopoly on the London-
Philadelphia route, where US Airways and American Airlines through its membership in a 
metal neutral181 joint venture with British Airways and Iberia (the "Transatlantic Joint 
Business") are the only carriers offering non-stop flights (the route is de facto operated by 
British Airways). The clearance decision of 5 August was conditional upon the release of one 
daily slot pair at London Heathrow and of other commitments in order to induce entry on the 
London-Philadelphia route. 
As part of its antitrust enforcement, the Commission continued its work on the transatlantic 
airline alliances. In May, the Commission adopted a decision accepting commitments offered 
by the Star Alliance members that operate a revenue-sharing joint venture on transatlantic 
routes182. The joint venture members183  addressed with those commitments the Commission's 
concern that the parties' cooperation might harm premium passengers on the Frankfurt-New 
York route in particular. The commitment package facilitates entry to that route by making 
landing and take-off slots available to new competitors. The parties also offered to enter into 
agreements allowing competitors to get better access to the parties' connecting traffic.  
                                                            
177 Case M.6663 Ryanair / Aer Lingus III, decision of 27 February 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_6663  
178 Case T-260/13 Ryanair Holdings v Commission  
179 Case M.6796 Aegean / Olympic II, decision of 9 October 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_6796  
180 Case M.6607 US Airways / American Airlines, decision of 5 August 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=2_M_6607  
181 "Metal neutral" refers to joint ventures where it doesn't matter which airline's plane, or "metal" in industry 
lingo, a passenger flies on because each carrier will get the same amount of revenue, and spend just as much to 
provide service on that route 
182 Case 39595 Continental/Untied/Lufthansa/Air Canada, decision of 23 May 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=1_39595  
183 Air Canada, United and Lufthansa 
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State aid enforcement in air transport 
The Commission is equally concerned that certain State aid measures in favour of airlines or 
airport operators affect negatively the competitiveness of other airlines and airport operators 
that do not benefit from such measures. For instance, some of those measures may artificially 
deviate traffic from efficient airports to inefficient subsidised airports located in their vicinity. 
Clarifying conditions of "good aid" 
As in any sector, State aid measures in the air transport sector can only be acceptable when their positive effects 
for European citizens outweigh their negative effects on competition and the internal market. This can be the 
case under certain circumstances, for example for aid measures in favour of airport operators when they increase 
the mobility of European citizens, combat air traffic congestion at major European hubs or facilitate regional 
development. The revision of the State aid guidelines for airports and airlines, which was in public consultation 
in July-September 2013,184 includes provision concerning:  
  - State aid for investment in airport infrastructure is allowed if there is a genuine transport need and the 
public support is necessary to ensure the accessibility of a region. In order to ensure the right mix between public 
and private investment, the maximum permissible aid intensity is larger for smaller airports. 
  - Start-up aid to airlines to launch a new air route is permitted provided it remains limited in time. 
  - Operating aid to airports is allowed for a transitional period of 10 years under certain conditions, 
thereby giving airports the time required to adjust their business model. 
In response to the public consultation the Commission received more than 140 reactions from Member States 
and stakeholders. The Commission analysed the responses and took them into account for the finalisation of the 
new guidelines – covering both airlines and the financing of airport infrastructure.. The new guidelines will help 
level the playing field for airports and airlines and be instrumental in combatting harmful State aid to airlines in 
the future. Amongst other things, the guidelines will clarify which arrangements between airports and airlines are 
acceptable and which arrangements are not. 
In that context, the Commission opened an in-depth investigation185 in July to verify whether 
Polish plans to fund the conversion of the former military airport Gdynia-Kosakowo (Poland) 
into a civil aviation airport are in line with EU State aid rules. A priori, it would appear 
difficult to justify major public investments in an airport that is located at only 25 kilometres 
from the existing uncongested Gdansk airport.  
The Commission has also opened in-depth investigations into a number of arrangements 
between airports and airlines with a view to establishing whether in those cases, airlines have 
benefited from incompatible State aid. Subject to final investigation, incompatible aid might 
be recovered from the airlines concerned. The experience gained in these on-going 
investigations fed into the adoption process for the new State aid guidelines for airports and 
airlines.  
Aid measures granted more directly to airlines in difficulty and in need of restructuring also 
remained in the focus of the Commission's attention. The Commission opened an-depth 
                                                            
184 Consultation of the draft Guidelines on State aid to airports and airlines, see IP/13/644 and MEMO/13/639 of 
3 July 2013, available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2013_aviation_guidelines/  
185 Case SA.35388 Setting up the Gdynia-Kosakowo Airport, decision of 2 July 2013, see IP/13/637 of 2 July 
2013 available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-637_en.htm  
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inquiry into a number of public support measures in favour of Estonian Air in February,186 
which was later extended in April to cover other additional measures.187 Similarly, the 
Commission opened in-depth inquiries into aid granted to Cyprus Airways188 and possible 
State support to SAS - Scandinavian Airlines.189 In May, the Commission temporarily 
approved rescue aid for LOT Polish Airlines190. In the previous November, the Commission 
had concluded191 that the sale of three of LOT's subsidiaries to State-owned entities did not 
involve State aid. 
Overcapacity in maritime transport 
The maritime freight transport sector suffers from of overcapacity, like other transport sectors. 
In January the Commission concluded an investigation into two cooperative schemes bringing 
together owners of small container vessels operating in the North Sea. The Commission was 
concerned with two aspects of those schemes: (i) the compensation offered to owners laying 
up their vessels during periods of overcapacity; and (ii) the exchange of recommendations on 
vessel charter rates. Following discussions with the Commission, the cooperatives agreed to 
abandon those two aspects and the investigation was closed192. 
Maritime transport – back to the general competition rules 
Competition enforcement in maritime transport had been for a long time based on the Liner Conference Block 
Exemption.193 The block exemption was repealed in 2008 and the Commission adopted Maritime Antitrust 
Guidelines194 to facilitate the transition from a specific to the general competition regime. These Guidelines 
expired in September, following a Commission decision in February not to prolong them. Therefore, since 
September maritime transport falls under general competition rules. 
In November, the Commission opened formal antitrust proceedings against 14 container liner shipping 
companies. The companies have made regular public announcements of intended price increases through press 
releases on their websites and in the specialised trade press. The companies usually make the announcements 
following one another, a few weeks prior to the implementation date. The Commission has concerns that this 
practice may allow the companies to signal their future pricing intentions to each other. It may lead to higher 
prices and harm customers on the market for container liner shipping transport services on routes to and from 
Europe195  
In times of overcapacity it is all the more important that competitors do not gain an unfair 
advantage from State aid. In July, for example, the Commission concluded that a long-
running Spanish aid scheme offering tax relief for the purchase of ships conferred a selective 
                                                            
186 Case SA.35956 Rescue aid to Estonian Air, decision of 20 February 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_35956  
187 See IP/13/332 of 16 April 2013. 
188 See IP/13/190 of 6 March 2013. 
189 See IP/13/567 of 19 June 2013. 
190 See IP 13/431 of 15 May 2013. 
191 See IP/12/1243 of 20 November 2012. 
192 See IP/13/82 of 31 January 2013. available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-82_en.htm  
193 Council Regulation (EEC) No 4056/86 of 22 December 1986. 
194 Commission Guidelines No 2008/C 245/02 of 26 September 2008. 
195 Case 39850 Container Shipping, see IP/13/1144 of 22 November 2013, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1144_en.htm 
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advantage to certain investors over their competitors196. The Spanish authorities must now 
determine the amounts of incompatible aid to be recovered. 
Enforcement actions in rail transport 
In order to improve the competitive performance of the rail transport sector and stimulate rail 
as a preferred mode of transport, the EU has adopted a number of 'railway packages'. In 
January, the Commission put forward the Fourth Railway Package197, which foresees the 
opening of the market for domestic rail passenger services to competition by 2019. The 
Package also aims to tackle the continued fragmentation of rail markets, strengthening the 
governance structure, as well as the high barriers to entry associated with the often special 
status of national rail incumbents.  
In fact, some rail incumbents manage the rail infrastructure and are at the same time active on 
rail transport markets. Such vertically-integrated rail incumbents may leverage their position 
as infrastructure managers to raise their competitors' costs or delay their entry.  
In the Deutsche Bahn case, the Commission investigated whether Deutsche Bahn's charges 
for traction current, i.e. the special electricity used to power locomotives, lead to a margin 
squeeze for its competitors in the rail freight and long distance passenger transport markets. In 
response to the Commission's concerns, Deutsche Bahn offered commitments opening up the 
market for the supply of traction current. These commitments were market tested by the 
Commission in August. Following amendments to the initial proposal, the Commission 
adopted a decision rendering the commitments legally binding on Deutsche Bahn on 18 
December 2013.198 In the Baltic Rail case, the Commission opened proceedings against the 
vertically-integrated Lithuanian rail incumbent, AB Lietuvos geležinkeliai ("LG") in 
March199. The on-going investigation concerns the removal of a track by LG connecting a 
refinery in Lithuania to the border with Latvia. The removal of that track could have 
prevented customers from using the services of other rail operators for the transport of freight 
between Lithuania and Latvia.  
In order to increase the attractiveness of rail as a mode of transport the Commission approved 
a number of State aid measures. In Poland, for example, the budget of the aid scheme200 
supporting investments in intermodal transport infrastructure and equipment was increased, 
while in Slovakia the construction of an intermodal terminal was co-financed by public 
                                                            
196 Case SA. 21233 Spanish Aid for the acquisition of ships – Spanish Tax Lease, decision of 17 July 2013, 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/elojade/isef/case_details.cfm?proc_code=3_SA_21233  
197 See Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic 
and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: The Fourth Railway Package – Completing the Single 
European Railway Area to Foster European Competitiveness and Growth, COM(2013)25 final of 30 January 
2013, available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:2013:0025:FIN:EN:PDF  
198 Case AT.39678 Deutsche Bahn 1, see IP/13/1289 of 18 December 2013 available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-1289_en.htm  
199 See IP/13/197 of 6 March 2013, available at http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-197_en.htm 
200 Case SA.36485 Investment aid for the development of intermodal transport under the Infrastructure and 
Environmental Operational Programme, decision of 31 May 2013, see OJ C/204/2013 p. 6 
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funds201. In both cases, the Commission made sure that a significant share of the costs was 
born by private investors, thereby ensuring the cost effectiveness of the projects. 
Continuing to apply the new rules ensuring the viability of SGEIs and fair competition across 
the Single Market in postal services 
Postal services is a classic network industry crucial to the functioning of the Single Market. 
Many European companies rely increasingly on just in-time deliveries to keep inventory costs 
at an optimal level. They often use parcel express delivery services as part of their logistic 
chains, notably for cross-border shipments. From a growth perspective, it is essential that 
cross-border postal deliveries operate as efficiently as possible. Efficient postal services are 
also a tool to tap the growing potential of cross-border e-commerce. At the same time, the 
postal sector constitutes a fundamental service of general economic interest (SGEI) which 
may need State aid in situations where the market by itself would not guarantee universal and 
affordable services. EU competition and Single Market rules reconcile those two imperatives. 
On 2 May, the Commission approved202 EUR 900 million compensation to the Belgian bpost 
for delivering a series of SGEIs (mainly a press distribution SGEI consisting in delivering 
newspapers and periodicals under specific conditions) between 2013 and 2015. That decision 
is emblematic for the application of the stricter compatibility conditions introduced by the 
new SGEI Framework:  
• The Belgian authorities had to organize a wide public consultation to demonstrate the 
importance of the compensated SGEIs for Belgian citizens;  
• The amount of aid approved by the Commission is based on the new net avoided cost 
methodology and takes into account strict efficiency requirements; 
• In order to comply with public procurement rules, Belgium committed to organise a 
competitive, transparent and non-discriminatory tender for the delivery of the press 
distribution SGEI in the future. The winning bidder will take over the delivery of the 
service on 1.1.2016. 
Bpost was also ordered to repay a significant amount of overcompensation (approx. EUR 123 
million) that it received in 2011-2012. 
Protecting competition in the sector of delivery services through merger control 
On 30 January the Commission prohibited the proposed acquisition of TNT Express by UPS. 
The take-over would have restricted competition in 15 Member States in the express delivery 
of small packages to another European country. In these Member States, the acquisition 
would have reduced the number of significant players to only 3 or 2, leaving sometimes DHL 
as the only alternative to UPS. The concentration would therefore have likely harmed 
customers by causing price increases.  
                                                            
201 Case SA.34369 Construction and operation of public intermodal transport terminals, decision of 21 January 
2013, see OJ C/45/2013 p. 13. 
202 Case N1/2013 State compensations to bpost for the delivery of public services over 2013-2015, Decision of 
the Commission of 2 May 2013, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/state_aid/cases/247935/247935_1463096_76_3.pdf  
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On 30 January 2013, the European Commission prohibited under the EU Merger Regulation 
the proposed acquisition of TNT Express by UPS.203 TNT Express (the Netherlands) and 
UPS (USA) both provide small package delivery services.  
The Commission found that the take-over would have restricted competition in 15 Member 
States when it comes to the express (i.e. within one day) delivery of small packages to 
another European country, namely Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, 
Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, the Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia 
and Sweden.  
In these Member States, the acquisition would have reduced the number of significant players 
to only 3 or 2, leaving sometimes DHL as the only alternative to UPS. The concentration 
would therefore have likely harmed customers by causing price increases. During the 
investigation, UPS offered to divest TNT's subsidiaries in these 15 countries and allow the 
buyer to access its intra-European air network for five years. The Commission carried out an 
in-depth assessment, including a market test where customers and other interested parties 
were consulted. However, these remedies proved inadequate to address the identified 
competition concerns.  
 
                                                            
203 Case COMP M.6570 UPS / TNT EXPRESS, decision of 30 January 2013; see IP 13/68, available at 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-13-68_en.htm  
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Annexes 
State aid cases:  Decisions adopted by the Commission in 2013 
Member State Type of measure / 
Beneficiary 
 
Type of Decision Date of adoption 
2013 
Austria SA.32745 - Run-off 
plan of Kommunalkredit 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
EXME/13/19.07 
19 July 
Austria SA.32554 - Liquidation 
of Hypo Group Alpe 
Adria 
Final decision 
IP/13/811 
3 September 
Cyprus SA.35852 - Prolongation EXME/13/22.01 22 January 
Cyprus SA.36930 - Prolongation EXME/13/25.07 25 July 
Denmark SA.36811 – Prolongation 
of the Danish winding-up 
and guarantee for 
merging banks schemes 
EXME/13/11.07 11 July 
France SA.35389 - State Aid SA. 
35389 (2012/N) Rescue 
aid in favour of Crédit 
Immobilier de France 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
IP/13/148 
21 February 
France SA.37075 - Crédit 
Immobilier de France – 
Prolongation of 
guarantees 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
EXME/13/14.08 
14 August 
France SA.37029 - Liquidation 
of Crédit Immobilier de 
France 
 
IP/13/1173 27 November  
Germany SA.29338 - Amendment 
of HSH Nordbank AG 
Restructuring 
Decision not to raise 
objections and opening 
of proceedings 
IP/13/589 
21 June 
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Germany SA.31646 -
 Amendment of 
the restructuring plan 
for Sparkasse Köln-Bonn
 
 23 July 
Germany SA.34381 -
 Amendment of 
Restructuring Plan of 
NordLB 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
IP/13/788 
22 August 
Germany SA.30062 - Amendment 
of LBBW 
EXME/13/1209 9 December 2013 
Greece SA.35460 – Liquidation 
of ATE 
IP/13/401 3 May 
Greece SA.31155 - Resolution 
of Hellenic Postbank 
through the creation of a 
bridge bank 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
6 May 
Hungary SA.36088 - Prolongation EXME/13/01.03 1 March 
Hungary SA.36087 - Prolongation EXME/13/22.03 22 March 
Ireland SA.36944 - Prolongation  18 July 
Ireland SA.31286 (MC9/2010) - 
Bank of Ireland 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
IP/13/669 
9 July 
Italy SA.36175 - MPS - 
Restructuring 
IP/13/1174 27 November 
2013 
Latvia SA.30704 - Additional 
aid measures to the 
Latvian Mortgage and 
Land Bank 
Final decision 
IP/13/705 
17 July 
Lithuania SA.36248 -Resolution of 
AB Ukio Bankas 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
EXME/13/14.08 
14 August 2013 
The 
Netherlands 
SA.35382 - Rescue aid 
for SNS REAAL 
IP/13/150 22 February 
The SA.29832 - Amendment  5 November 2013 
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Netherlands of ING 
The 
Netherlands 
SA.29832 - Monitoring of 
ING 
EXME/13/1211 11 December 
2013 
Poland SA.35943 -  Prolongation EXME/13/11.02 11 February 
Portugal Rescue recapitalisation 
of Banif 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
IP/13/31 
21 January 
Portugal SA.36180 - Portuguese 
Guarantee Scheme on 
EIB lending 
 27 June 
Portugal SA.35338 - Restructuring 
of Caixa Geral de 
Depósitos, S.A. (CGD) 
 
Final decision 
IP/13/738 
24 July 
Portugal SA.36869 - Prolongation 
of the Portuguese 
guarantee scheme 
EXME/13/01.08 1 August 2013 
Portugal SA.34724 - Restructuring 
of Millennium BCP / 
Portugal 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
EXME/13/02.09 
29 September 
2013 
Portugal SA.37417 - Amendment 
of the Guarantee Scheme 
on EIB lending 
 7 October 2013 
Slovenia SA.37315 - Rescue aid in 
favour to Factor Banka 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
IP/13/822 
6 September 
Slovenia SA.37314 - Rescue aid in 
favour of Probanka 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
IP/13/822 
6 September 
Spain SA.36500
 Restructuring of 
Banco Gallego 
Decision not to raise 
objections 
IP/13/745 
25 July 
Spain SA.36249 - CEISS –  25 July 
 65 
 
Amendment decision 
 
Cases currently under formal investigation procedure  
(in-depth investigation under the rules of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union on State aid) 
Country Type of measure / Beneficiary 
 
Date of 
decision 
regarding the 
opening of 
formal 
investigation  
 
 
Belgium SA.33927 (2012/C) (ex 2011/NN) –
Guarantee scheme protecting the 
shares of individual members of 
financial cooperatives 
3 April 2012 
IP/12/347 
Case under 
assessment 
Slovenia SA.33229 - Restructuring of NLB 2 July 2012 
IP/12/724 
Case under 
assessment 
Greece SA.34488 - Restructuring aid to 
Proton bank through creation and 
capitalisation of Nea Proton 
27 July 2012 
IP/12/854 
Case under 
assessment 
Greece SA.34823 - HFSF Recapitalisation 
commitment to Alpha Bank 
27  July 2012 
IP/12/860 
Case under 
assessment 
Greece SA.34824 - HFSF Recapitalisation 
commitment to National Bank of 
Greece 
27  July 2012 
IP/12/860 
Case under 
assessment 
Greece SA.34825 - HFSF Recapitalisation 
commitment to EFG Eurobank 
27  July 2012 
IP/12/860 
Case under 
assessment 
Greece SA.34826 - HFSF Recapitalisation 
commitment to Piraeus Bank 
27  July 2012 
IP/12/860 
Case under 
assessment 
Greece Resolution of Hellenic Postbank 
through the creation of a bridge 
bank 
6 May 2013 Case under 
assessment 
Germany  SA.29338 - HSH Nordbank AG 21 June 2013 
IP/13/589 
Case under 
assessment 
 
 
